EU Enlargement and Turkey’s Accession Process Interview Series II

In this second interview of Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey) in regard to EU enlargement process and Turkey’s accession perspective, we have a distinguished scholar from İstanbul Kemerburgaz University, Assist. Prof. Dr. Beken Saatçioğlu. Saatçioğlu kindly shares her views with the readers of Research Turkey on the recent developments in EU enlargement process and Turkey’s accession to the EU.

A Synopsis of the Interview:

“So, first and foremost, the EU will have to resolve its own economic problems before focusing on enlargement”.

“Can the EU really “absorb” a big, Muslim country like Turkey? This question is not discussed in official EU documents but we know it is a highly relevant question, especially in the context of debates on immigration to the EU”.

“So I think it is more realistic to assume that even if the EU decides to admit Turkey one day, it may do so by imposing derogations and/or safeguard clauses on critical EU policies which would make it particularly hard for the Union to absorb Turkey as it is”.

“I think the fact that the (privileged partnership) status has been specially  created for Turkey makes it sufficiently obvious that the EU is particularly reluctant when it comes to Turkey’s membership”.

“In any event though, we know that the Turkish government is extremely critical about the (privileged partnership) status and has so far rejected it at every single occasion”.

“It seems like the EU will have to keep Turkey waiting for many more years to come”.

“I think the obstacles on the way to membership are twofold: On the one hand, the Turkish government has to keep reforming particularly in regards to assuring Turkish citizens’ and especially, political opponents’ fundamental freedoms. On the other, the EU should not block Turkey’s membership path by politicizing the process of membership negotiations which have been partially on hold since 2006”.

“I think the EU has the right to raise the Cyprus condition to Turkey as part of its “good neighbourly relations” criterion […] Rather, what’s wrong and unfair is the fact that the EU only raised this condition to Turkey, and not to the other sides to the Cyprus dispute, namely, Greek Cyprus and Greece as a guarantor state”.

“[…] the implementation of the Additional Protocol represents an obligation of EU membership […] So when seen in this light, Turkey is under the obligation to open its ports to Greek Cyprus to ensure the customs union in practice. However, as it has been the case with the Cyprus condition, this issue too has been handled unfairly by the EU”.

“[…] Turkey’s chances of membership are pretty slim. I think it is best to be realistic about this”.

The Full Text of the Interview:

“Enlargement will not be the EU’s priority after the economic crisis”

To start with the recent events within the EU, we observe that the EU leaders are struggling with the economic crisis in Greece and even there emerged pessimistic debates about the future of the EU. What do you think about the future of the EU enlargement since the EU has been in the middle of crisis? How does the crisis influence the EU enlargement?

To be honest, I don’t think enlargement is the EU’s priority at this particular juncture. The crisis in the Eurozone and economic hardship in several member-states,  like Greece  Spain, Portugal and now especially Cyprus have certainly shifted the EU’s focus away from enlarging further. This  is understandable because the EU is an organization which has invested so much into achieving economic integration at a sound basis. So, first and foremost, the EU will have to resolve its own economic problems before focusing on enlargement. This doesn’t mean the EU cannot “absorb” the memberships of the next countries in the accession queue – Iceland, Croatia and potentially, the Western Balkan applicants. It simply means that it will have to get back on its feet, economically speaking, before moving on to the next step, that is, enlargement.

Referring to the Turkey’s accession process, EU’s integration or absorption capacity is very often expressed by many among the representatives of EU member states and also in Commission reports on Turkey and enlargement. How do you define EU’s absorption capacity and how many more members do you think the EU will be able to integrate?

My view of the EU’s absorption capacity is more or less in line with the European Commission’s official definition of the concept: Absorption capacity is mostly a technical matter; that is to say, it has to do with the implications of new memberships for the EU’s budget, policies and institutions. If enlargement is considered potentially harmful for any of these three, then we say that the EU does not have to capacity to absorb new member-states. However, as we know from Turkey’s dealings with the EU, the cultural/religious dimension is also important for absorption purposes. Can the EU really “absorb” a big, Muslim country like Turkey? This question is not discussed in official EU documents but we know it is a highly relevant question, especially in the context of debates on immigration to the EU.

I don’t think the issue of absorption can be reduced to how many members the EU is considering to integrate. What rather influences the fate of absorption is the economic and budgetary aspects of each new membership. The EU would be able to integrate relatively smoothly the small countries in the Western Balkans. That would be so much easier than integrating Turkey alone, for example.

“Turkey’s potential membership would likely have the same impact on the EU than that of the ten Central and Eastern European countries’ memberships combined, which happened in 2004.”

Do you think that EU’s absorption capacity is overemphasized in the case of Turkey? Is the EU able to integrate Turkey to the EU?

I don’t think it is overemphasized at all. Turkey is the largest country which has ever applied for EU membership, and so the EU has every single right to be concerned about “absorbing” it. As the European Commission itself has noted in its own “impact studies” on Turkey, Turkey’s potential membership would likely have the same impact on the EU than that of the ten Central and Eastern European countries’ memberships combined, which happened in 2004. Yes, Turkey’s economy has been growing and relatively speaking, the country has managed to spare itself from the crisis we observe  in the Eurozone. But this doesn’t mean that it is without any problems. Currently, Turkey’s GDP per capita is still far behind that of Greece for instance and the economy is very much plagued by vast income inequalities and regional disparities. All of these things create serious problems for the EU when it comes to potentially integrating Turkey. So I think it is more realistic to assume that even if the EU decides to admit Turkey one day, it may do so by imposing derogations and/or safeguard clauses on critical EU policies which would make it particularly hard for the Union to absorb Turkey as it is.

The momentum in Turkey’s accession process was lost by 2005 due to a significant decline in the credibility of EU conditionality, referring to the privileged partnership debate among member states and increasing application of EU conditionality on the basis of other criteria than the political criteria for accession. What do you think about the debate on privileged partnership for Turkey? Is the EU’s reluctance special to the Turkey’s accession process or are there any other cases of enlargement signifying EU’s reluctance to enlarge as was in the case of Turkey?

Privileged partnership status has not been mentioned before to any EU candidate other than Turkey. It is a status which was designed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Christian Democrats back in 2004, and also supported by Austria and France’s Sarkozy. These people justified the initiative by arguing that a privileged partnership between the EU and Turkey is far better than an underprivileged EU membership – that is, second-class EU membership status – for Turkey.  I think the fact that the status has been specially  created for Turkey makes it sufficiently obvious that the EU is particularly reluctant when it comes to Turkey’s membership.

If not full membership, what options do you think are there? Do you think could there be differentiated layers of EU membership?

Obviously, as I just mentioned, there is the status of privileged partnership which falls somewhere between associate EU membership (which Turkey has since 1964 as a result of its Ankara Agreement with the EU) and full membership. But the status has not been offered before to any EU candidate and so it is something which is rather envisaged in theory at this point. We still don’t know exactly what it looks like; so it is hard to say what kind of differentiated membership layer it would represent. In any event though, we know that the Turkish government is extremely critical about the status and has so far rejected it at every single occasion. So even if it the EU defines it precisely and offers it to Turkey one day, it will simply not be accepted by the government and therefore it cannot be viewed as an option, in my opinion.

Do you think there is any possibility or will of the EU to strengthen its credibility in Turkey’s accession process or is the loss of momentum a relief for the EU, which seems to be struggling how to deal with Turkey as a candidate for EU membership?

At this point, I must say I’m rather pessimistic about the possibility of any reversal in the EU’s handling of Turkey’s membership issue. Ultimately, integrating Turkey as a member-state represents a huge cost for the EU, plus there is so much opposition to Turkey’s admission among the European public. Among all candidates, Turkey has traditionally been the least supported one. So I think the trends speak for themselves: It seems like the EU will have to keep Turkey waiting for many more years to come. This is more realistic  than any other alternative happening when it comes to the EU’s Turkey policy.

“On the one hand, the Turkish government has to keep reforming particularly in regards to assuring Turkish citizens’ and especially, political opponents’ fundamental freedoms. On the other, the EU should not block Turkey’s membership path by politicizing the process of membership negotiations which have been partially on hold since 2006.”

How do you evaluate Turkey’s compliance performance with regard to the Copenhagen and acquis criteria? And what do you think as the biggest obstacle in front of Turkey’s EU membership?

This is a very big and important question. Turkey has come a long way in meeting the Copenhagen criteria – even Turkey’s critics within the EU would admit this much. Since it earned official EU candidacy in 1999, Turkey has achieved key reforms, at least legislatively, especially concerning democratization which is the number one condition for EU membership. However, much more remains to be done. I think the obstacles on the way to membership are twofold: On the one hand, the Turkish government has to keep reforming particularly in regards to assuring Turkish citizens’ and especially, political opponents’ fundamental freedoms. On the other, the EU should not block Turkey’s membership path by politicizing the process of membership negotiations which have been partially on hold since 2006.

By 2006, Cyprus issue came to scene as the most important stumbling block for Turkey’s accession to the EU. How do you evaluate the approach of the EU on Cyprus issue and the settlement of the dispute in the island as a precondition for Turkey’s accession to the EU? Do you think that this is an example of the application of EU conditionality on the basis of an informal criterion – outside the formal/technical political criteria?

I think the EU has the right to raise the Cyprus condition to Turkey as part of its “good neighbourly relations” criterion. Yes, the issue is not related to the EU’s democracy condition as defined in Copenhagen back in 1993. But it is relevant in the context of the EU’s expectation of good neighbourly ties among its potential member-states and in that sense, the condition is not entirely “informal”. Rather, what’s wrong and unfair is the fact that the EU only raised this condition to Turkey, and not to the other sides to the Cyprus dispute, namely, Greek Cyprus and Greece as a guarantor state. Conflicts are phenomena which by nature involve more than one state. And so pushing only one side and not the others on this issue is not fair. That is why the Cyprus condition has been criticized so much in Turkey. In May 2004, the EU offered Greek Cyprus membership and this happened despite the fact that Greek Cypriots had rejected the Annan Plan.  This triggered perceptions of EU unfairness within the Turkish government and thus increased criticisms about the Cyprus condition.

“the EU has not held its promise and as long as it does not develop a constructive approach regarding the situation of Turkish Cypriots, Turkey can legitimately hold off on opening its ports to Greek Cyprus, in my opinion.”

What about the partial freeze of EU accession negotiations with Turkey due to the EU’s insistence on the implementation of Additional Protocol, comprising all new members including the Republic of Cyprus, and Turkey’s refusal to do so? Specifically related to the Cyprus issue, does this signify an unfair approach by the EU, as was portrayed by many in Turkey, or is it simply an obligation of Turkey as a candidate country on the basis of the recognition of all member states, which is a primary rule of the EU?

I will say that yes, technically, the implementation of the Additional Protocol represents an obligation of EU membership. Turkey has customs union with the EU since 1996 and so when new countries join the Union, it is legally under the obligation  of extending the customs union to the newcomers. The obligations of EU membership include all aspects relating to the process of European integration which has been going on since the 1950s, particularly and in this case, the single market and free movement of goods which requires freedom of transport. So when seen in this light, Turkey is under the obligation to open its ports to Greek Cyprus to ensure the customs union in practice. However, as it has been the case with the Cyprus condition, this issue too has been handled unfairly by the EU. Turkey signed the Additional Protocol to the Ankara agreement (extending the customs union to Greek Cyprus) in July 2005 under the condition that the EU would take steps to end the economic isolation of Turkish Cyprus. But the EU has not held its promise and as long as it does not develop a constructive approach regarding the situation of Turkish Cypriots, Turkey can legitimately hold off on opening its ports to Greek Cyprus, in my opinion.

Considering both  Turkey’s compliance trend and EU-related issues, such as absorption capacity, do you think that Turkey has a chance to become an EU member state one day?

My personal opinion is that considering all of the above, Turkey’s chances of membership are pretty slim. I think it is best to be realistic about this. Even if Turkey perfectly fulfils the conditions of membership one day, there is still no guarantee of membership, given the EU’s reservations about it. Regardless of the degree of Turkey’s compliance, membership is ultimately the EU’s decision and it is a political decision since it has to be approved by all existing EU member-states unanimously. So it can always be blocked within the Union  based upon member-states’ political considerations.

Thanks a lot for sharing your thoughts on the recent developments in the EU enlargement and particularly on Turkey’s accession process. 

© 2013 ResearchTurkey. All rights reserved. This publication cannot be printed, reproduced, or copied without referencing the original source.

Please cite this publication as follows:

ResearchTurkey (May, 2013), “Interview with Dr. Beken Saatçioğlu: “Turkey’s chances of membership to the European Union are pretty slim.””, Vol. II, Issue 3, pp.47-53, Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, ResearchTurkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=3268)

The Conference of the Chair of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change:

 Dr. Rajendra K. Pachauri
20 May, 2013
İstanbul Turkey

The Chair of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Dr. Rajendra K. Pachauri, will give a speech as a guest of Energy Economy Association in Boğaziçi University. Registration is required.

Location: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Albert Long Hall

Date: 20 May 2013
Hours: 10:00-12:30
Registration: eed@boun.edu.tr     

The EU accession process has created pressure on Turkish authorities to converge with the EU practice and policy priorities in irregular migration. Yet, the EU rules are not simply downloaded into the national structure; rather they are accommodated at the domestic level at different speeds and to varying extents. While Turkish authorities has recently agreed on a common text with the European Commission with regard to a readmission agreement which obliges Turkey to take back large numbers of irregular immigrants and have adopted a comprehensive law on the migration related issues; they delay establishing a civilian border agency with respect to border management and act reluctant to lift the geographical limitation in asylum procedure.  Turkey, even takes a step back in compliance with the EU regulations by removing visa requirements for the countries on the EU’s Schengen negative list in recent years. Mostly filtered by domestic priorities and national interests, the compliance with the EU priorities with regard to management of irregular migration varies across different sectors of the policy.

Introduction

Geographically located on a major migration route between immigrant-producing areas and developed countries of the West and North, Turkey receives considerable number of irregular migrants every year (Kaya 2008, Kirişçi 2008). Also historical events and forces such as the Iranian revolution, political turmoil in the Middle East, end of the Cold War and the Gulf War turned Turkey into a de facto country of first asylum, a country of destination for illegal migrants and a transit migrant country (IOM 2008, İçduygu 2008, Elitok/ Straubhaar 2010).With the recent influx of in Syrian refuges in Turkey and regular media coverage of transit migrant caught in tragedies put irregular migration high on the political agenda (Bürgin 2011, Kirişçi 2008).

Managing irregular migration has also become one of the critical headlines shaping trajectory of Turkey’s accession process to the EU (Özçürümez /Şenses 2011, İçduygu 2010, Vukašinović 2011). With the acceleration of the EU accession process after 1999, the role of the EU has become more visible and credible with regard to the setting of a formal agenda and a timetable for eventual rule adoption in migration related issues (Kirişci 2003, İçduygu 2007, Kaya 2009, Lagrand 2010).Since then Turkey has made substantial effort to reconstruct of the asylum and migration policies and border control systems in line with the priorities of the Union on irregular migration. Yet, the convergence to EU’s practice and policy priorities varies across different aspects of the policy leading to different compliance levels. While Turkish authorities has recently agreed on a common text with the European Commission with regard to a readmission agreement [1]which obliges Turkey to take back large numbers of irregular immigrants and have introduced a comprehensive law on migration related issues; they delay establishing a civilian border agency with respect to border management and act reluctant to lift the geographical limitation in asylum procedure.  Turkey, even takes a step back in compliance with the EU regulations by removing visa requirements for the countries on the EU’s Schengen negative list [2] in recent years. Before exploring the factors counting for this puzzling outcome with regard to management of the irregular migration, the paper assesses the scope of irregular migration in Turkey.

Irregular migration in Turkey

The existing studies on “irregular migration” in Turkey have analyzed irregular migrants under three groups (a) transit migration (illegal entries) (b) circular migration (overstays) and (c) asylum seeker and refugee movements (İçduygu 2008, Kirişçi 2008a, Kaya 2008a).[3]

The largest group of irregular migrants were apprehended in Turkey are transit migrants. Most of these transit migrants enter Turkey illegally and attempt to leave with the help of human smugglers.  In the Turkish legal context an “illegal migrant” is anyone who enters or leaves Turkey or is present in Turkey while breaching migration law (passport, visa, residence and work-permit legislation). In the beginning of 1990s the total number of ‘illegal migrants’ apprehended by Turkish security forces was below 20.000 (İçduygu 2008, Kirişçi 2008). Since then the number of illegal immigrants gradually increased and reached a peak of 94.600 in 2000 and started slightly dipping after 2001. Although the number of illegal transit migrants arrested fluctuates since then, there is a considerable decrease in recent years. In 2010, the number of arrested illegal migrants has dropped to 34.000, but has increased to 44.000 in 2011 (Figure1). In the first half of 2000s the highest numbers of illegal migrants were coming from Iraq (114.000), Pakistan (51.000), Afghanistan (38.000), Iran (25.000) and Bangladesh (20.000). But after 2007, the numbers of illegal migrant coming from Palestine (35.000), Burma (25.000) and Somalia (25.000) have considerably increased (Directorate of General Security of Ministry of Interior 2012; UNCHR 2011).

Figure 1: Illegal Transit Immigrants arrested by Turkish security forces
Source: Directorate of General Security of Ministry of Interior, UTSAM Report, May 2012

The circular migration is formulated as being mobility back and forth between sending and receiving counters in the European Commission Communication (EC 2005).Thus, it refers to persons who enter into Turkey legally but overstay or make multiple trips to get involved small-scale trade and work illegally. This group involves suitcase traders, illegal labour migrants especially on construction sites and in the tourist sector and trafficked persons – especially women- who work illegally as household helps and sex workers or laborers. Suitcase trade to Turkey started in the late 1980s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet, the volume of this suitcase trade from the ex-Soviet world has dropped significantly, while equivalent trade involving North African countries has increased. On the other hand, irregular circular labour migrants are those from Romania, Bulgaria Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Kirişçi 2008, İçduygu 2005, Kaya 2008a).

The asylum seeker and refugee movements are also analyzed under irregular migration in Turkey. Turkey has long borders with the Middle East where most of the states are associated with violence, terrorism, political irregularities, and economic instabilities. This makes Turkey more vulnerable to entries for asylum purposes. As a country of asylum, Turkey is among the original signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention. Yet, the country ratified the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and its Protocol in 1967 with a limitation related to their geographical application which makes country one of the last remaining countries maintaining this limitation with Monaco, Congo and Madagascar (Kirişçi 1996). The geographical limitation allows Turkey not to grant refugee status to asylum seekers coming from outside Europe. More specifically, non-Europeans are not recognized as refugees[4] (mülteci), instead, they are called asylum seekers[5] (sığınmacı) or conditional refugees (şartli mülteci). Turkey grants tem­porary stay to non-European refugees with a view to enable them to resettle in a third state, mostly in Untied States and Canada but also in a number of EU countries. The task of finding resettlement places falls to UN High Commission for Refugees (UNCHR) (Zieck 2010).

The number of asylum seekers has drastically increased in 2000s and has reached a peak of 11.929 by 2009 due to the political and economic upheavals situations in bordering countries, mostly in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Palestine and Somalia which makes the resettlement process more difficult and longer. This has also paved the way to the illegal entries of asylum seekers into Turkey especially those coming from Somalia and Afghanistan (Akbaş 2011). It should be also added that after Syrian uprising, tens of thousands of Syrian refugees were registered to Turkey. The number of Syrian refugees in Turkey reached 150.000 by December 2012 who were settled in tent cities, near Hatay province of Turkey with the status of temporary protection (Reuters 2012).

Yet, there are also applicants who wait for resettlement or for their status to be determined by the Ministry of Interior. Within all the applications half of them were granted refugee status and re-settled in other countries. However, since the time for a decision takes longer due to higher number of applications, asylum seekers either become illegal migrants in Turkey, go underground or they try to join the ranks of illegal transit migrants (asylum seekers especially coming from Ruanda, Sri Lanka and Mauritania). This is also occurring with rejected asylum seekers who either choose to stay on in Turkey illegally or try to smuggle themselves into the EU (Kirişçi 2008, Akbaş 2011). In sum, irregular migration has recently become a salient problem in Turkey.

The management of the irregular migration has also one of the priorities that the EU has set for Turkey in its Accession Partnership Documents for eventual rule adoption. After Turkey obtained an accession perspective in December 1999 successive governments have made substantial effort to reconstruct of the asylum and migration policies and border control systems in line with the priorities of the Union on irregular migration. These measures fall under the Chapter 24 on Justice, Security and Freedom and include regularizing illegal immigrants; establishing a penal framework for the supporters of irregular migration; tackling illegal employment; cooperating with third countries on issues such as joint patrols and surveillance; strengthening of external borders and concluding international agreements on readmission and human trafficking. Yet, the convergence to EU’s practice and policy priorities varies across different aspects of the policy leading to different compliance levels.

Management of irregular migration

The EU accession process has created pressure on Turkish authorities to converge with the EU practice and policy priorities in irregular migration. Yet, compliance with the EU rules and practices varies across different sectors of the irregular migration policy: human trafficking and smuggling, asylum and refuge movements, border control, readmission agreement and visa regulation.

Human tracking and asylum movements

In case of human trafficking and smuggling, the efforts of ruling elites to converge with EU priorities date back to early 2000s. After the signature of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention), its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons Persons Especially Women and Children. More importantly, a National Action Plan on Combating Human Trafficking prepared by the National Task Force was approved in 2003. The plan laid out a roadmap for the adoption of necessary legal changes in line with the EU acquis. Accordingly, authorities adopted new measures in a number of legislations that regulate this policy field such as the Passport Law, the Law on Residence and the Travel of Foreign Nationals, the Law on Work Permits of Foreign Nationals, the Law Concerning the Fight against Global Criminal Organizations, Law on Citizenship, Road Transport regulation, the 1994 Asylum regulation[6] and Witness Protection Law. While these measures have enhanced the rights for victims of trafficking with regard to free medical treatment, residence and work permits, they have also improved of the capacity of the administrative agencies to prevent trafficking and smuggling activities. Moreover, the new Penal Code that came into force in 2005 increased penalties for these criminal activities. In line with the legal changes regarding issues in human trafficking, hundreds of judges and prosecutors and officials of the Ministry of Interior have been trained since 2001.[7] Besides legal changes, Turkey has become part of international organization dealing with migration related issues such as International Organization for Migration (IOM). In cooperation with the IOM, Turkey has been involved in several projects to combat human trafficking, which were mostly financed by the EU (IOM 2008).

Turkey’s efforts to align with the EU policies with regard to prevention of illegal migration and work, and improvement of the capacity to control illegal migration have continued with introduction of an Action plan on Migration and asylum and establishment of a new Bureau for Asylum and Migration under the Ministry of Interior in 2008. The Bureau has prepared Turkey’s first draft law on migration in 2011 as a result of a highly transparent and participative law making process (Kirişçi 2011, Tolay 2012). The Draft “Law on Foreigners and International Protection” was submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in January 2012. Finally, in April 2013, the law was adopted and came into force.[8]

The new law on Foreigners and International Protection also regulates the asylum and refugee movements more properly. The 1994 regulation was the first piece of legislation at the national level dealing with the asylum issues, which was primarily drafted with national security concerns and hence introduced strict regulations governing access to asylum (Kirişçi 1996:304). The regulation identified the Ministry of Interior as the body responsible for status determination. Yet, UNHCR came to perform de facto refugee status determination on behalf of Turkey. Since then and UNHCR has become a decisive actor for the asylum and migration issues in the country (Kirişçi 2001). This Regulation attracted serious criticism from western governments, as well as from major international human rights advocacy groups. The regulation was amended in 1999 mostly as a result of the ideational conflicts and debates between Turkish authorities and the UNHCR on the asylum procedure (Kirişçi 2001:96). This was also accompanied by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruling for Jabari v. Turkey (2000)[9]. The regulation was amended once more in 2006 by a Circular prepared by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) as a result of the judicial developments, mostly inspired by, the ECtHR rulings (Zieck 2010:601). In recent years, Ministry of Interior has issued three circulars with the aim of ensuring better access to and information on the asylum procedures (Baklacıoğlu 2009).

The new law, which has become public in January 2011 through the Ministry of Interior webpage, introduces standards regarding implementation of the asylum regime and provides significant improvement in the lives of refugees and asylum seekers. The law is Turkey’s first law on the issue and is regarded as a landmark development (UNCHR 2011). More importantly, it has come at a time when the credibility of the EU accession perspective has dropped dramatically and even the chapter 24 (on Justice and Home Affairs, where issues of asylum and migration are mostly contained) is yet not open to negotiations.

It is mostly argued that the ongoing efforts of the Turkish government in field of migration and asylum is mostly inspired by the transnational exchanges between Turkish officials, and the EU, UNHCR, IOM and non-governmental organizations at domestic level (Kirişçi 2011). The governmental actors have highly benefited from the scientific advice and consensual interpretations of the academicians and policy experts on the field during the preparation phase of the law. This has eased the progress and reduced potential conflict on policy specific issues and thereby no clear resistance can be identified in this policy sector (Özçürümez/Şensens 2011:245). Moreover, the ECtHR rulings sentencing Turkish governments to pay compensations to the complainants and the critics of the Council of Europe ‘shaming and naming’ Turkey induced massive pressures on the government for further reforms.

In the new law, Turkey maintains persistent resistance to lifting the geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention. Having been introduced due to the massive influx of Kurdish refugees from Iraq between 1988 and 1991, the geographical application limits Turkey’s obligations in international refugee law (Kaya 2009:5). In the 2005 National Action Plan, the Turkish government proposed to lift the limitation by 2012, on the condition that the legal and institutional arrangements for asylum and the understanding on “burden sharing” with the EU were in place (NPAA 2005, IOM 2008, UNCHR 2011). Thus, Turkish officials delay lifting geographical limitation before getting the EU membership status due to concern about possible influx of massive asylum seekers and refugees (Kirişçi 2008:20, İçduygu 2011:18) and the huge financial burden on the country they would create (cf.Thielemann 2003, Thielemann 2005). Although the level of compliance with the EU priorities is high in these policy sectors, there are still reservations on some pertinent policy items such as lifting geographical limitation.

There is a similar kind of resistance to the establishment of an integrated civilian professional border unit that would replace the current military-based institutional set-up with respect to border management, and signing of a readmission agreement with the EU (Kirişçi 2007, Özçürümez/ Şenses 2011, İçduygu 2011). Yet, policy-specific external incentives such as visa liberalization may seriously affect the likelihood and direction of the compliance, as we observe in signing a readmission agreement with the EU.

Border management and visa regulation

The EU membership requires adopting a string of measures to enhance the border management. There are different structures to manage border control within the EU member states. Yet, it has become common to be dependent on a civilian authority with regard to the Integrated Border Management (Özler 2010:2-3). Although the border control is under responsibility of Ministry of Interior in general, the east and southeastern land borders of Turkey is controlled by the land forces of the Turkish military[10] and the coastal guard under Ministry of Interior is responsible for patrolling the sea coast (Kirişçi 2007:20). While Ministry of Interior, the General Directorate of Security carries out passport control and entry-exit checks, the movement of goods at the border gates is controlled by Undersecretary of Customs.

In order to comply with the EU legislation and practice in the area of border control, Turkey has set up a Directorate for Integrated Border Management under the Ministry of Interior and adopted a national strategy on the Protection of External Borders in Turkey. Accordingly, Turkish authorities have adopted significant legal changes and administrative arrangements to improve institutional infrastructure and technical capacity at borders. Further, Turkey participated in the CIREFI (Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration) Early Warning System and started sending of statistical data on a regular basis, actively took part in various EU-driven Illegal Migration and Violation of Borders programmes, and took substantial steps to conclude working arrangements with FRONTEX (EU Border Management Agency).

In line with the National Strategy on border management, which was adopted in 2006, Turkey was expected to establish a new civilian, non-military, border law enforcement body under the Ministry of the Interior replacing current military-based institutional set-up to perform border control tasks in 2010-2011. Yet, Turkey remains reluctant to establish the civilian border control body due to security concerns and counter terrorism plans in relation to the defense and protection of its eastern and southern borders (Apap et al. 2004, Kirişçi 2007, Özçürümez/Şenses 2011, Vukašinović 2011, İçduygu 2011).  Although Turkey has taken substantial steps to align with EU’s practice in border control the compliance has stayed limited in this aspect of the policy area largely due to failure of the government to establish the civilian border control body.

A similar domestic resistance and lack of change, or in better words, institutional inertia[11] was also observable in concluding a readmission agreement with the EU. As one of the oldest tools of the EU in combating illegal migration, concluding readmission agreements with third countries of origin and with the EU itself, (Bouteillet-Paquet 2003), is part of the conditionality applied to any state as part of the pre-accession procedure. In 2001 Turkey began to sign and negotiate readmission agreements with the source countries of irregular immigrants who transit through Turkey. By 2009, Turkey had signed readmission agreements with Syria (2001), Greece (2003), Kyrgyzstan (2003), Romania (2004) and Ukraine (2005). The negotiations for further agreements with Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, China, and Bulgaria still continue while agreements with Egypt, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Georgia, Israel, Sudan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Mongolia have been drafted and submitted (Özçürümez/Şenses 2011). However, the persistent resistance remained in the area of signing a readmission agreement with the EU itself until today.

The official negotiations with the EU on a readmission agreement began in 2005 since the EU created a link between the start of readmission talks and the start of the EU accession talks. Yet, the negotiations forestalled in 2006 mostly due to the EU’s decision in December freezing negotiations on eight chapters with Turkey[12], including the Chapter 24. The forestalled negotiations restarted during Swedish EU presidency in 2009 when the EU and Turkey agreed on an extensive package of co-operation. Three years after the talks restarted, in 2012, the European Commission declared that an agreement with the Turkish government on a readmission agreement was reached. This agreement that obliges Turkey to take back illegal immigrants, who have used Turkey as a transit country on their way to the EU, will create substantial adoption costs for Turkey especially at a time when the membership incentives offered by the EU are weak to pay them off (Bürgin 2012).

The emerging compliance in case of readmission agreement is explained by the cost-benefit calculations of the Turkish government (Bürgin 2012:884). The European Commissions’ green light to start visa liberalization dialogue and mobility[13] in exchange for a readmission agreement as in the case of the Balkan states has considerably changed political preferences of the ruling elites and direction of the negotiations (İçduygu 2011, Bürgin 2012, Tolay 2012). The European Commission has also taken a critical decision since some member states (especially France and Germany) tend to oppose to such an approach in the case of Turkey because of the potential influx of Turkish immigrants into the EU (Özler 2012, Bürgin 2012). The Commission is expected to present a visa exemption action plan in this autumn. Turkish authorities demand simultaneous implementation of visa-exemption and the readmission agreement, so that, the readmission agreement will be signed only when the EU presents the action plan.

While in the readmission agreement there is a move from inertia to the compliance with the EU priorities, the visa regulation envisages a reversed compliance; moving from compliance to retrenchment[14] (see Radaelli 2003, Tolay 2012). Turkish visa regulation considerably changed throughout the time due to various domestic and international factors such as Özal’s liberalization approach in foreign policy in 1980s, the regime change in Iran 1980s and 1990s and collapse of communism (Hale 2000, Oran 2001). Yet, the main factor shaping Turkish practice has been the EU accession process which accelerated after 1999 (Apap et al. 2004). Turkey started to align its practice with the EU in 2002. The Turkish visa system is based on three categories of entry into Turkey. The first one is the group of countries whose nationals can enter and remain in the country for a predetermined length of time, usually three months, without visas. A second group is a category of countries whose nationals must obtain visas prior to arriving in Turkey. There are no problems in the first two categories. In the third category, however, Turkish practice is criticized by the EU. For the third category of countries (including 30 countries) Turkey issues sticker visas at the frontier in return for a fee that varies from country to country. This category also includes countries that are on the Schengen negative list and subject to strict visa regulations. For an effective border control the EU requires Turkey to abolish visa-free travel for those countries that are on the EU’s negative list and the usage of “sticker visas” at border control points (Apap et al. 2004:26)

Turkey was also committed to match the EU’s negative list by the end of 2004, except Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia due to close historical and cultural ties with these countries. Turkey started to implement that policy, and by 2005, only five countries remained on the list to be fully aligned to the Schengen negative list (down from 13 countries in 2002). Yet, after this initial period of compliance and commitment Turkey started abolishing visas with the countries that are on the EU’s blacklist, such as Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Russia, and Serbia. The process of visa opening is underway with Qatar, Malaysia, Bahrain and Kyrgyzstan (Tolay 2012:45-6).

It is commonly argued that the visa openings have become an integral part of Minster of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu’s new foreign policy approach which aims to create zero problems with the neighbor (Kirişçi 2011a:43-4).  Several scholars claim that AKP government has started to shift the axis of Turkish foreign policy away from the EU (Öniş 2009, Terzi 2010, Kirişçi 2011a), moving towards a multi-dimensional and cooperative approach aimed at improving especially trade relations with the non-EU neighbors, and strengthening its role as a regional power in the Middle East (Baç 2011, Öniş /Yılmaz 2009). The visa liberalization has become a tool of soft power for this new foreign policy strategy (Kirişçi 2005). It is argued that Turkey is, in a way, emulating (see Börzel/Risse 2009) what the European integration project has achieved in Europe [15] and trying to encourage greater economic integration and interdependence in Turkey’s neighbourhood (Nykänen 2011, Kirişçi 2011a).

Conclusion

EU accession created pressure on the Turkish authorities to converge with the EU practice and policy priorities in irregular migration. Yet, the empirical evidence suggests that the convergence with EU’s priorities and policy practices varies across different aspects of the policy. This paper argues that domestic impact of the EU has been shaped by domestic priorities, national interest and preferences of the political actors. When the EU demands do not fit to strategic calculations of ruling elites and national interests (Yılmaz 2012, Börzel/Soyaltin 2012), the likelihood of compliance with the EU requirements decreases, as in the case of setting up a civilian agency with respect to border management, abolishing visa-free travel for the countries on the Schengen negative list, and lifting geographical limitation in asylum procedure. Yet, policy-specific external incentives, such as visa liberalization, may compensate adaptational costs and change cost benefit calculations of the ruling elites, so that the likelihood of compliance increases as in the case of singing a readmission agreement with the EU.

Diğdem Soyaltın

Please cite this publication as follows:

Soyaltın, Diğdem (May, 2013), “Good news, Bad News or No News: Management of Irregular Migration in Turkey”, Vol. II, Issue 3, pp.33-45, Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, ResearchTurkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=3237)

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Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas 2009: Diffusing (Inter-) Regionalism: The EU as a Model of Regional Integration , KFG Working Paper Series, No. 7, September 2009, Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) „The Transformative Power of Europe“, Free University Berlin.

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2013 has been declared by UNESCO “The year of Piri Reis” on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the Map of 1513. As one of the most beautiful and mysterious maps to survive  the Great Age of Discoveries drawn by the Ottoman Admiral Piri Reis,“The Piri Reis World Map” is an  invaluable piece of the World’s documentary heritage as it provides insight on the history of its time. The conference is held with the cooperation of the University of Greenwich and University of Piri Reis to reveal the mystery of this world heritage piece. 

Speakers: Prof. Gregory Mclntosh, Author of The Piri Reis Map of 1513, USA

Metin Ataç, Retired Admiral (Former Commander in Chief of The Turkish Navy),

The President of the International Association of Maritime Studies (IAMS), TURKEY

Moderator: Prof. Dr. Osman Kamil Sağ, The Rector of Piri Reis University, TURKEY

Location:  The University of Greenwich
King William Building, King William Lecture Theatre 315
Greenwich

London SE10 9LS

Admission is free. Booking advised.

E-mail: embassy.londonfa.gov.tr
More information: http://www.meblem.org.uk/

Turkey is an energy poor country. It could produce only the %12 of the 20 million ton crude oil it consumed in 2011.([1]) As for natural gas, its situation is even more desperate: it had to import almost all of the 44 billion m³ natural gas it consumed in 2011, the amount it could produce was only 800 million m³.([2]) Naturally, the bill of country’s energy import is also too high: 54 billion dollars for 2011. The picture we get when we take a closer look at what this number means is: with exports of 135 billion dollars in 2011 and imports of 241 billion dollars, more than one fifth of the country’s total import is consisted by energy, and almost the half of the income earned from export is spent on this. But the main element that makes this serious foreign trade imbalance more alarming is that the increase in energy import, both in quantity and price, raises the increase of total export and import. In 2011, while total export of the country increased %18,5 and its import increased %29 compared to previous year; its energy bill increased %40,5 compared to previous year.([3]) If there were not the high bills it paid for energy import, rapid growth of the country(compared to the past)  in recent years would have reached to a more awe inspiring point. Prime minister (and other fronts of the government party) finds the credit rating that the Moddy’s, Fitch and S&P gave to the country insufficient, but these international credit rating agencies consistently (and righteously) ask “what about the current account deficit?”

The reason why Turks revolt against this poorness is that its neighbours wallow in petroleum and natural gas reserves but the nature was very ungenerous with them. They cannot find an answer to “Why do not we have the thing that is abundant in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Russia?” This revolt might not be harmful in itself; but there is another common sceptical thought that is applicable for all the underground resources, which really is a serious block for the efforts of petroleum and natural gas exploration works: Having an untreatable doubt against all those who want to extract the underground resources! You can see this complaint not only in village coffeehouses but also in serious political discussions and open sessions. For example, a foreign oil company drilled an oil well, but could not find oil or the well was unproductive of petroleum in economical quantities, so it closed the well with cement, then left. The locals would approach this incident as: “Actually they found oil, but to avoid us to benefit from it, they closed the well and left!” All the rational explanations you will make opposing this belief would be ineffective; you cannot make people believe that any private company, that found oil in an economic amount in the well which it drilled by spending millions of dollars, would not give up extracting it under any circumstances. Another very common and interesting belief among people is this: Actually, all the oil reserves and mineral resources in Turkey can be clearly seen even with the naked eye by the satellites, but foreigners conceal this information from us intentionally!

Overstatement and lottery fondness in Turkey are among the factors that spoil the scientific analysis. We had managing directors who said that these little natural gas reserves found from time to time are “as big as to save the entire country”. Most of the people continue to believe that one day, God will have the work in hand and we will discover uncommonly rich natural resources in our lands. (It already happened in the case of boron mines.) In brief, “in our home” it is not easy to make rational evaluations about petroleum and natural gas.

Sacred Petroleum, Holy National Interests

Nowadays, a new bill is introduced to the General Council of Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) to change the exploration of petroleum and natural gas regime which was valid for many years. Petroleum Law no. 6326 (let us call it “old” law) was introduced in 1954  including the most comprehensive ones in 1970 and 1983, it was changed for many times, but it became outdated. The “over protective” form was its most substantial feature.

According to the old law, exploration of petroleum in Turkey was almost a “holy” act, it could only be done by the national company Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), and other domestic and foreign companies were hardly licensed. “Compliance with national interests” criterion was overemphasized; and it was primary in the evaluation of the applications.

Foreign oil companies were perceived as “agents”. The old law formulated this suspicion with ambiguous statements such as: If there is a “financial interest” of a foreign country in the administration of a company, then it was not possible for that company to search for oil in Turkey. This kind of companies also could not carry out other activities that are related to petroleum, could not own movable and real estate properties for that purpose. (If really necessary, they could be licensed only by the council of ministers) Let us explain this provision like this: For example, if this provision was valid in Kazakhstan, then Turkish national company TPAO, not only would not be able to search for oil there but also would not be able to even open a liaison office! Petroleum companies could export %35 onshore and %45 offshore of the petroleum they extracted. They had to allocate the rest for “needs of the country”.

Old law granted privileges to the national oil company TPAO; TPAO could hold the operating licences it had indefinitely, also it was more advantageous than other companies with respect to the number of licences it could have. Oil fields that do not hold an operating licence were offered to TPAO without tendering for a contract, if TPAO accepted it then it would not be offered to another company. Production areas of the companies, whose term of licence is over, were assigned to TPAO without questioning.

Oil companies had to extend the return of their oil exploration/extraction spending a long period of time, and they were subject to high rated corporate tax. It was possible for upper tax limit to reach %55.

This kind of provisions would not pose a problem if they were applied in Iraq being rich in oil, but in Turkey it frightened the companies.

Besides these rules that “frighten away the applicants”, the law was full of legal gaps and these gaps were opening a door for bad intentions. For example, exploration licences were not based on a working plan (and assurance), companies could wait until the term of the licence to end without doing anything and by keeping the oil field. Fake oilmen, who took advantage of this gap, were marketing their licences in the black market.

Did Protectionism Work?

The answer of “How did the balance of country’s oil searching-finding-operating evolve in this law’s validity period?” is not pleasant at all.

In Turkey, from 1954 until now, only 4.103 exploration and production wells were drilled. As of 2011, only 2.3 million ton crude oil was extracted from the active 1.180 wells.([4])Average efficiency of all the wells in the country is 38 barrel/day. Daily output of the well with the highest production is 698 barrels and we even have wells that produce 1 barrel/day.([5]) All the natural gas we could extract in 2011 was from 283 wells. The high number of wells with the small amount of production indicates that Turkey is not that much of a “preferable” geography for oil companies. Number of wells that are drilled till now is insufficient for a country of 780.000 km². Our seas are still pretty much untouched; hence, we did not lose our hope of discovering “enormously productive” fields. But in the light of our experiences of more than four thousand wells, this is not likely to happen.

The President’s Veto, Apathy of the Parliament

Complaints about the old law continued for years. A bill was introduced to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in June 2004, after waiting in parliamentary commissions for 2,5 years, it was accepted as late as  January 17, 2007. In the law no 5574:

• “Compliance with national interests” notion was not included.
• There was no the rule of allocating an amount of the extracted oil for needs of the country.
• The ban on companies which “have a financial interest with a foreign country” was removed.
• A progressive system was accepted in public securities which was %12,5 in the old law. The public securities were to be determined separately onshore and offshore, also they were to be related to the amount of production. A regime that is starting from %2 and up to %12 was proposed.
• %50 of the public securities derived onshore accepted to be transferred to the special administration of the province it was extracted.

This law was vetoed by the president of the time, with the reasons stated above in 5 points. The president was objecting to all the reformist points in the law.

In the constitutional orders of the Turkish Republic, the president’s veto does not pose a real obstacle against the will of the parliament. If the parliament wishes, it can resist against the veto, and (without changing anything) oblige the president to pass it by introducing the bill again. Of course, it is also possible to reconcile with the president by making changes on the bill according to the reasons for veto. But the parliament did not do any of these for the Petroleum Law, it remained silent.

One of the president’s veto reasons was always found “appropriate and right” and it was the rule of “to leave half of the public securities derived from the produced oil to local authorities”. Indeed, it is not acceptable for a unitary state to distribute the natural resources “according to the province it was extracted”. But it is still unknown why the parliament did nothing about other changes on which every interested party agreed upon, and why waited to enact these.

New Law, New Term, and a Prediction: Nothing Will Change!

The new law introduced to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey is based on this “vetoed law”, which has been waiting since 2007, but it will not encourage the oil (and natural gas) exploration as much as we expect. Because, despite having many positive changes, it ignores the most critical problems and it even falls behind the 2007 bill in some points.

It is surprising that in account of public securities, the system projected in “vetoed” 2007 bill, which encourages offshore drilling specifically and has a graded rate for indexing public securities to the “extracted oil”, is renounced and the position in act 1954 was returned to. It will be possible to make little discounts only for low gravity oil.

Foreign company phobia leaked into few points in the new bill. The bill subordinates the capital movement that causes a change in the administration control of oil reserve holder company to the “prior approval” of the minister. (Nobody knows what monitoring the administration control of a giant world company whose stocks have been taken up and sold in New York Stock Exchange will bring to the daily production of wells in Turkey.) Another phobic leak is: According to the new bill, the foreign oil company must certainly be a “stock corporation”. The “government-owned” corporations, as is TPAO, may not be able to explore oil in Turkey from now on.

Basing the collecting public securities in cash on market price instead of per-well price, appears to become a source of inequity for producing companies. Because transportation of the extracted oil to the closest market expenses are included in the market price, and thereby the companies which pays the public securities by the well with oil will make more profit than the ones that pay in cash.

New term has some positive anticipation too. Foremost, exploration licences must be grounded on working plans (and assurance). It will not be possible to remain as a licence holder without doing any activity for years anymore. Those who do it will be fined and lose their licences. Another positive development is that the export prohibition on a portion of extracted oil is removed. Companies will be obliged to sell only the amount of oil that is necessary in regard to Turkey’s security of supply, inside the country.

In new term, unless companies retrieve their exploration costs fully, they will not pay taxes for their oil earnings. This is maybe the most important change in new term. But the most important factor that would encourage companies to explore is skipped: Tax reduction. Tax rate that can come up to %40 is notably high for extremely risky oil sector; Turkish geography increases this risk more with its reserve ratio. It would be good to provide opportunities for companies to consolidate their drilling expenses.

Position of TPAO

Maybe the most positive change of the new term, surprisingly, formed the focus of criticisms brought for the bill. National Company TPAO will have no difference than other licence holder companies anymore. Its privilege of “exploring on behalf of the state” is removed; “expiring” licences will no longer be assigned to TPAO without auction.

It will be better for professionals who prefer TPAO to keep its privileged position, to think about how this national company will become a “global player” with its present legal, administrative, (and of course financial) structure, it is impossible for TPAO to make a great number of searches with new technologies in risk areas. Except the Azeri-Çıralı-Güneşli oil income arose from the relationship between the leaders of Azerbaijan and Turkey (the company has a share in this production field as much as %6,5) the company has no overseas oil income, its domestic income is inefficient, the amount it spared is pretty small. Above all, it is unorganised in fields other than oil production (transmission, refining, etc.). The company that is unable to have income from sub-branches also cannot make sufficient resource transfer to the drilling works.

Conclusion

New oil regime proposes some favourable changes but what is essential is not amendment, it is change of perception. We must overcome the irrational fear. To form a privilege for the state is an outdated choice of “closed economy” and we have never benefited from it in the times it was implemented.

Instead of basing the oil exploration/extraction on rules that are recognized in all the world markets like predetermining licence areas, evaluating technical capacities of the applicants properly, setting rational business plans for licensees, and taking away the licences of the ones who do not comply with these rules; grounding it on “national interests” was not reasonable.

At present, 24 foreign and 24 domestic corporations are exploring oil and natural gas in the fields of Turkey. It is necessary to increase the number of these companies, encourage them to drill more wells and to try expensive new technologies. It should not be forgotten that the most favourable oil for “national interest” is not the one inside the earth’s crust, it is the one “that is being extracted” in any way necessary.

‘European Diplomacy in Action: A Post Lisbon Assessment’
13 May 2013, 14:00-16:00
Ankara, Turkey

Ankara University European Research Center organizes a conference on ‘European Diplomacy in Action: A Post Lisbon Assessment’ with the participation of Jean Maurice Ripert, Ambassador of Head of Delegation of European Union to Turkey. Admission is free. 

Location: ATAUM Conference Hall, Ankara University, Cebeci Campus

Announcement of this conference: http://ataum.ankara.edu.tr/13mayis.pdf

Research area: Humanities & Social Sciences
Frankfurt, Germany

At the department of Human Geography, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main, Germany, a postdoc fellowship in sustainable transport/mobility research as part of the Goethe International Postdoc Programme (GO‐IN) is available, starting in September, 2013 for a 12‐24 month period.

For the application a research proposal is expected. The proposal should relate to sustainable transport by at least one of the topics (1) understanding travel behaviour dynamics, (2) urban form, accessibility and transport or (3) travel demand / mobility management. Additionally, (4) a topic related to climate change mitigation by transport options would be of interest (for further information on the group’s projects, please visit

http://www.geo.unifrankfurt.de/ifh/mobilitaet/mobility/index.html

Eligibility criteria:

-          full‐time research experience of minimum 4 years (incl. the phase of the PhD) and max. 10 years, part-time experience is to be converted into full‐time equivalent

-          applicants may not have spent more than 6 months in Germany in the past three years

-          completeness of the application form and further documents

-          applying for a time span between 12 and 24 months

-          the applicant’s research project generally fits into our research profile

Call deadline:
May 31, 2013, 24:00; Fellowships start September 2013.

Contact person: Prof. Martin Lanzendorf.
Email: Lanzendorf@geo.uni‐frankfurt.de
Phone +49 69 798 35181

Website: http://www2.uni-frankfurt.de/research/go-in

Over the last decade, as the “great moderation” found its passage onto the path of “great recession” it would not be a mistake to portray the growth process of the Turkish economy as “a gradually-deflating balloon, subject to erratic and irregular moves”.  Yet, if so, the real question becomes: what is the source of this speculative growth? (Or – if the readers will pardon my slangy expression what is the inflammatory gaseous source of this balloon?).

Weakening of the Link From Current Account Deficits to Growth

I would argue that a key distinguishing feature of the Turkish economy over this period was that the (positive) correlation between the growth rate and foreign savings (current account deficit) jumped to successfully higher thresholds in almost a permanent manner.

One should note that traditionally Turkey was not an economy generating high current account deficits. Observe for instance, that during the 1990s, the growth rate of national income was 3.6%, while the ratio of current account deficit to gross domestic product remained below 1%. Starting from 2003, annualized current deficit increased to the 3-4% band, and then jumped above 6% after 2006. In 2009, the growth rate, in parallel with the global recession, was (minus) 4.8 as the current deficit went down. However, then, in 2010, the ratio of current account deficit to national income restarted to increase. The data included in the Table 1 below exhibits these observations.

Table 1

After 2006, Turkish economy has started to operate with a considerably high-rate (above 6%) of current account deficit in order to achieve positive growth. 2012 is the year when this observation has become clearer. In contrast to the “mild descent” scenarios as expected by the official bureaucracy and the international financial speculators, this period represents a new threshold in the process of transforming Turkish economy into a foreign debt-ridden economy presenting a heaven of cheap imports and labour surplus.

What is also alarming is the poor quality of the mode of financing of the aforementioned deficits. The following table encapsulates this issue.

Table 2. Current Account Balance and Selected Financing Items ($ Million)

It can be read from the data that 91% of the current account deficit for the year 2012, namely USD 48.8 billion, was financed by net inflows of portfolio investments and unrecorded capital inflows (so-called net errors and omissions). However, in retrospect, the percentage of the said-items in the current account deficit was around 40% in 2010 and 2011.

Being predicated on portfolio investments and unrecorded capital inflows, the hot money flows present the most volatile form of capital, which is also the most sensitive one to abrupt swings of foreign exchange speculation. These kinds of capital inflows, as created by hot money flows based on speculative incentives, account for the primary reasons responsible for excessive volatility and uncertainty in real sectors of the national economy.

Debt-Driven Accumulation

In 2008, Turkey’s national income, the gross domestic product (GDP), was USD 742.1 billion with a total external debt stock of USD 241 billion, USD 52.5 billion of which was composed of short term debt. Data presented in Table 3 indicate the Turkish economy’s external borrowing and growth adventure during the process of global great recession (2008 – 2012).

Table 3. Debt-Led Growth in Turkey

From 2008 to 2012, over the so-called great recession cycle, the Turkish economy has accumulated net extra external debt amounting to USD 55.8 billion in total. Over the course of the same period, Turkish gross domestic product has advanced to USD 786.4 billion with a cumulative increase of USD 44.3 billion. That’s to say, after 2008 the total net increase in external indebtedness was higher than that of the national income.

Another astonishing aspect of this growth miracle, which was running the Turkish economy into a debt trap at a dizzying speed, is that the external borrowing is mostly characterized by short-term structure.  The net increase in short-term external debt stock, USD 48.4 billion, accounts for 87% of the overall increase.

A related question is which agents (institutions) were the dominant sources of this episode. I know that a satisfactory answer to this question requires a more comprehensive analysis going far beyond the scope of this column, yet I believe that we can make comments about the overall tendency that we have derived from the official data. The official data show that out of the net increase of USD 55.8 billion in external indebtedness, USD 18.5 billion was generated by the public sector (including the Central Bank), while USD 37.3 billion was contracted by the private sector. Almost all of the private sector external debt was in turn concluded by the financial institutions. Only 1.6% (corresponding to USD 0.6 billion) of the net increase of USD 37.3 billion in private sector external indebtedness was generated by non-financial institutions.

Table 4

However, the case was the exact opposite before 2008. Approximately two-thirds of the USD 100 billion net external debts accumulated by the Turkish private sector during the period 2003-2008 were accumulated by non-financial real economy sectors. Since the 2008/09 crisis, the real sector companies have seemingly declined using credit by way of external borrowing. Turkey has been, once again but much more severely, possessed by speculative fluctuations led by the risk appetite of the financial arbitrageours.

***

An economy, whose short-term external debt is increasing more rapidly than its national income… Rating agencies, whose recent decisions have been celebrated by the Turks as a matter of national pride, are undoubtedly familiar with these facts. Yet, one should not be naïve in matters of international political economy, and have a clear state of mind in that Turkey’s position in the new international division of labour is an extension of not only purely economical, but also political preferences of collective imperialism. The myths of “economic successes” are now ballooned via political elements.

Professor Erinç Yeldan, Dean, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Yaşar University, İzmir

Please cite this publication as follows:

Yeldan, Erinç (May, 2013), “Turkey’s Debt-Ridden Growth”, Vol. II, Issue 3, pp.20-22, Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, ResearchTurkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=3176)

Chairman of The Rights and Liberties Party (HAK-PAR), Poet and Writer

2^nd Part

Once again a possibility of giving an end to the armed conflict in Kurdish problem has come to the agenda. In the first part of the interview, we had discussed the history of the Kurdish politics in Turkey since the separation of Kurdish movement from Turkish left in 1960s with Kemal Burkay. In the second part of the interview, Mr. Burkay, Chairman of the Rights and Liberties Party, poet and writer, analyses changes in the political demands of Kurdish politics that follow Öcalan’s footsteps throughout years and the position it has taken in the recent peace process for Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey).

A Synopsis (Summary) of the Interview:

“So the Kurdish movement was evolving in a mass, pacifist way and was able to control the area in the 1960s-1970s. The PKK appeared, and declared this movement as an enemy.”

“The army didn’t let the civilians to change even a bit.”

“PKK considered the establishment of People’s Labour Party (HEP) as a betrayal.”

“The PKK does not allow the BDP, similar how the army did not allow other parties’ initiative once.”

“Öcalan and his party, the PKK, were already saying ‘Independent Kurdistan’. He accused federation and autonomy demands as betrayal. He considered these as ordinary, criticized it as reformist.”

“After he was arrested, Öcalan started to support the unitary state and Kemalism.”

“I think this was a perfect engineering work from the beginning till the end. The PKK’s establishment, its reorganisation after Öcalan was caught, the fixation of the broken nets were a great engineering work by the government.”

“We demand an inclusive definition of citizenship in the new constitution, more powers to local governments, right to education in mother tongue, the recognition of Kurdish language as the second official language of Turkey and federation.”

“The CHP must support constructive steps and if it finds the steps insufficient, it must come up with well-coordinated proposals and projects for the resolution of this problem.”

“It’s obvious that KCK has been developed as a government project to control the Kurdish movement.”

The Full Text of the Interview:

“The PKK brought nothing to Kurdish people. But we have reached a stage where even government, at least politicians, realised that this issue cannot be resolved with violence.”

Even if the PKK had been built by the deep state, couldn’t have the PKK later by ending the relation became an important part in the Kurdish movement? You told that you gained lots of acquisitions on behalf of the Kurdish people by peaceful political struggle before 1980 whereas the PKK terrorized both the region and the Kurdish movement. You mentioned that once it was established, how the PKK first targeted you and other Kurdish organisations and committed murders. As for the 1990s, we see that legal Kurdish parties appeared during this period and provided growing success, despite the permanent closures. And success, especially by new generations, is demoted to or at least associated with mostly the rise of the PKK, the environment it created and the serious connections these parties have with the PKK. But you claim that Kurdish movement that lasted in spite of the military coups, experienced the greatest loss with the PKK’s appearance?

New generations, unfortunately, do not know about that period’s story. Old members, who worked in TİP, TİSİP, TKP, know it. For example we shared the administration of TÖB-DER with TİSİP. In the second period, there were DEV-YOL, Kurtuluş, TİSİP and us, we shared the administration of TÖB-DER, and we were working together in the unions. That period’s democratic left members know us. Back then the PKK had not come out yet, it appeared in 1978. As soon as it came out, it applied armed methods that can be described as terrorism. It was not only towards us, for example, they shot many provincial heads of the TİKP (headed by Doğu Perinçek at the time). In Antep, in Urfa they shot the TİKP’s provincial heads. Then Perinçek became friends with them, it’s surprising! So the Kurdish movement was evolving in a mass, pacifist way and was able to control the area in the 1960s-1970s. The PKK appeared, and declared this movement as an enemy. Then coup occurred, Kurdish movement was terrorized but didn’t provide any acquisitions. The region was turned upside down, 4000 villages were burnt down, and millions of people were exiled. 50000 people lost their lives, 100 billion liras was wasted in this dirty war. Community got soiled, mafia-type organizations appeared inside and outside of the state. So in Turkish side militarism, in Kurdish side the PKK grew stronger; the PKK that doesn’t have democracy in itself and does not tolerate any view other than its own view, any organization other than itself, and uses violence.  Therefore, society got into a whirl of violence, it was captured by violence. Now we are trying to get out of this situation. Since this is the way it is, it is not right to say that the PKK brought anything to Kurdish people, the PKK brought nothing to Kurdish people. But we have reached a stage where even government, at least politicians, realised that this issue cannot be resolved with violence. For the first time, Demirel (Süleyman Demirel) said “We acknowledge the Kurdish reality”, took a step, but couldn’t do much. Then Mesut Yılmaz said that “The way to European Union passes through Diyarbakır”, that is to say, the necessity of the resolution of the Kurdish issue. But he couldn’t do much, either, because the army was controlling everything. The army didn’t let the civilians to change even a bit. Çiller (Tansu Çiller) showed the Basque example. You know, at that time Çiller was engaged with that dirty war as the prime minister. She acted as the Iron Lady by saying “I’ve won all the wars; I will also win this one”. But from time to time she realised that this issue cannot be solved with suppression. But they also put words into her mouth right away. So they captured Tansu Çiller and Mesut Yılmaz, too. Demirel already acted consistent with the army. He, you know, could easily manoeuvre about this matter, and he did, until the beginning of 2000s.

“All right, Kurdish people lost a lot, they lost 30 years, but Turkey couldn’t gain anything from this, lost a lot. We lost mutually, Turkey couldn’t be democratised.”

So the explanations that Mesut Yılmaz made weren’t simple and populist, is that so? We know how powerful the military tutelage was in every area in 1990s. Do you suggest that the army captured the political parties and they didn’t have a chance to do anything inside that chain? On the other hand did the PKK capture Kurdish parties?

Kurdish movement was legalized in the 1990s with the establishment of HEP. We also contributed to its establishment. Back then I wrote articles, I said there is a need for a legal, mass party. Mostly social democrat, a democratic party I mean, not a socialist one. Our works and the domestic works of our friends got united with the congressmen, who were exported from the CHP because they were dealing with the Kurdish issue, unionists also participated and HEP came out. Our friends were very efficient in that party. PKK was against it, even described it as a betrayal. It is something that the PKK always does, if it is controlling something then there’s no problem, that’s O.K. If it is not, then sees it as an enemy. That’s what happened in the beginning, and then the PKK stepped in and seized the control. It was the time of the PKK’s massification. Then DEP was established. There were the PKK’s supporters, our supporters and people from other groups also in DEP. However DEP couldn’t work at ease, either, because of the PKK’s domineering and interventionist methods. PKK captured the organisation. After that, we went our separate ways. I mean, in legal platform, our supporters and the PKK’s supporters dissociated in the process. Our supporters founded other legal parties and the PKK’s supporters founded their legal parties. This legal tradition has survived until today. I find myself close to HAK-PAR. HAK-PAR was founded in 2002, I helped with the phase of its establishment at the backstage. I always said this; “There is a need for a party which highlights the legal methods, democratic methods”. Patriotic Kurdish people who do not adopt the PKK’s methods got together in here. They exclude violence but defend Kurdish people’s demands.

Can’t other Kurdish parties, for example the BDP, defend Kurdish demands freely?

They are under the PKK’s tutelage; they are not able to act freely. The PKK does not allow the BDP, like how the army did not allow other parties’ initiative once. Now you see how they silenced politicians from the BDP. Look at Osman Baydemir, he said that “Armed struggle have completed its appointed time”, they excluded him, silenced him. Ahmet Türk said something similar, they shut him up, insulted him. They silenced Leyla Zana. In the 1990s Turkish politicians were in this situation. When military tutelage regresses, one way or another civil politics gains its freedom. And now this is the problem, I mean the PKK actually didn’t provide any acquisitions after all, made us lose a lot. We lost our 30 years because of the PKK and even if the PKK fades from the scene and guns are buried; we will have a rehabilitation phase maybe for 30 more years. It was a great loss, who did this; it was military forces, conservative forces who wanted to protect the status quo. They thought that they can avoid social movement by the force of arms, by suppressing with force, but they were wrong. This damaged Turkey a lot. All right, Kurdish people lost a lot, they lost 30 years, but Turkey couldn’t gain anything from this, lost a lot. We lost mutually, Turkey couldn’t be democratised.

“Guns to be silenced and the PKK to bury the guns primarily will help the BDP to do politics freely. The Kurdish movement, Kurdish politics will become normal.”

But today the BDP praises itself for painting the East in one colour and receiving considerable amount of votes. Isn’t it important for a party that sympathizes with the PKK and defends Kurdish people to take over many cities?

Is taking over many city- municipalities enough alone? Also in the past, those cities’ mayors were Kurdish, people from that region. Either from the AKP or the BDP, it doesn’t matter. What matters is the chosen ones to be effective in the Kurdish issue. That is what’s going on with the resolution of the Kurdish issue, to what extent we use our language, to what extent Kurdish people co-determinate, is mother-tongue education provided?

Even so, the BDP is a massified party, haven’t you ever thought about participating in the BDP, uniting with it or leading a struggle in it? Is it a deadlock that the BDP can’t keep its distance from the PKK?

The BDP is a legal party as HAK-PAR, but it couldn’t keep its distance from the PKK. They already say that “we have the same base”. Therefore they can’t frankly tell the PKK to stop the violence and when they do they are being oppressed. We experienced this in the past too, you get nowhere with an association that uses violence. So I say that the BDP is also a massified party, it is quite powerful. We, I mean HAK-PAR, don’t have that kind of a power yet. Approximately 100 municipalities, 30 parliamentarians, support of 2 millions of votes, mass support; these are extremely important. But the BDP can’t keep its distance from the PKK, and so it can’t turn this power into a gain. It’s continuously affected by the PKK and it’s not able to do politics freely. Guns to be silenced and the PKK to bury the guns primarily will help the BDP to do politics freely. The Kurdish movement, Kurdish politics will become normal.

So you say that Kurdish politics might have several parties?

Of course it can happen, there can be good relations, alliances, electoral alliances between these parties. But guns must be silenced, violence must end. There mustn’t be a military tutelage over Kurdish Politics.

“What is democratic autonomy? They say that there is no need for borders, we don’t demand land, and Turkish language can stay as the official language. But this does not exist in any part of the world.”

I want you to open up HAK-PAR a bit. What makes HAK-PAR different from the BDP?

One of our differences from the BDP is the programme issue. The BDP and the pre-existing party that’s been shut down couldn’t act freely when they were creating their programmes. For instance, Öcalan gives orders from İmralı and they change their names, programmes according to these orders, it’s not right. It does not happen in HAK-PAR. Second one is, HAK-PAR is against violence. It frankly says: weapons must be silenced, the PKK should lay down the arms, we say this, and they don’t say it. This is a very important difference. Thirdly, we support federation; an equality-based federation for the Kurdish people. They weren’t defending anything before, and then they brought up something called “democratic autonomy”. What is democratic autonomy? They say that there is no need for borders, we don’t demand land, and Turkish language can stay as the official language. But this does not exist in any part of the world.

So, what the BDP defends is a lower autonomy than federation, is it?

Yes, it’s neither a federation nor autonomy. Autonomy can be regional, cultural. Generally when “autonomy” is mentioned, it means regional autonomy. You give the right of an autonomous government to the people who have different specialties in a specific region. When this happens, that region has its borders, symbol, flag, and parliament. If it speaks a different language, it becomes its official language.  Now Kurdish people form the majority in nearly one third of Turkey’s geography. They have their own language, they have a history and culture. Therefore, for the resolution of the Kurdish issue a federative or autonomous body must be formed. But an autonomous body means regional autonomy. So these are empty demands. Öcalan and his party, the PKK, were already saying “Independent Kurdistan”.  He accused federation and autonomy demands as betrayal. He considered these as ordinary, criticized it as reformist. He said, “Kurdish people must have a separate state, an independent state”. But after Öcalan got caught, he dropped all his demands. He said that independency, federation and autonomy are out of date demands, we want a “democratic republic”, and the PKK accepted this. The PKK even changed its name and was named as KADEK, became KONGRA-GEL. Then changed its worldview, first it was socialist, Marxist, left these ideologies behind, it went on like this until 2004. Finally “democratic autonomy” came into the picture.

So the PKK left its Marxist-Leninist standing?

Mr. Ümit, leave Marx and Lenin aside, they started to support Kemalism. Then this empty “democratic autonomy” came into the picture, guess why? What is democratic autonomy? In political terminology there is no such term. This is exactly a contradiction in terms and it’s being made on purpose. This is only a pacifier for distracting Kurdish people. Legal party BDP directly holds onto Öcalan’s these statements.

“This is the difference between the BDP and us; we know what we want, they don’t.”

Why do you think they brought this up? Don’t you ever think that the BDP and Öcalan cannot put their demands forward openly for now and later in the process they will give voice to their demands? Or do you think that this is not the way to do politics? For example they mention democratic autonomy, you claimed it to be an empty term, at this stage they say this but after achieving it they ask for something else and it goes on like this… Haven’t we experienced this with other leaders and parties?

No, I see the PKK and the BDP’s situation as tragicomic. After Öcalan got arrested, he dropped everything, he surrendered, he changed his point of view 180 degrees. And the BDP has never been free from İmralı’s demands and control. The BDP did whatever Öcalan ordered. After he was arrested, he did whatever the government ordered, back then general staff was dominant. Öcalan told them “I do whatever you ask from me”.

Do you think after Öcalan was arrested, Öcalan and therefore the PKK, totally got under the control of government? Do you see the PKK’s starting armed actions again as a part of a new dirty game that the government is also a part of?

Öcalan said exactly these at the court “I’m regretful, I did wrong, give me a chance to correct my mistakes. I don’t want a federation, independency or autonomy anymore, these are out of date”, and he started to support the unitary state and Kemalism. His association hesitated first, and then became dependent on Öcalan. Because this kind of an association, the PKK is organized under one chief, it only accepts him. They idolised him… The PKK followed its idol. If an association is free, and if it is really an association, it would come up against this. It would say “Okay, Öcalan can say so, but we don’t accept this, we have demands.” The PKK didn’t do this, like a cult that follows its sheikh… The ones who had different thoughts, who opposed were eliminated and this happened under the control of the deep state. Öcalan is under control in İmralı. They controlled the PKK through Öcalan and they didn’t disband the PKK. Öcalan said “we laid down the arms completely”, “open the way so that guerrillas will surrender”, so he meant, “they should lay down the arms”; but the government did not accept this. They said there is no need to disband it, we can use the PKK. Therefore even though that the PKK left its guns, name, everything, and fired no bullets until 2004, it didn’t come to an end. Then what did they do in 2004, they started to use arms again, they said lets fight a bit. Öcalan sent his lawyer to Kandil, he said “We will fight” and they started a war. And now they brought up this “democratic autonomy’ fairy tale for show only, this is a pacifier only for distracting the masses. It’s empty, has no other aim than distracting the masses. This is the difference between the BDP and us; we know what we want, they don’t.

“Military tutelage is regressed. Some of the generals who led a coup are being judged now; the army control over İmralı has reduced. The government strengthened its hand. Now the government is trying to disarm the PKK through Öcalan. If the PKK disarms, everybody wants this; the door for peace and resolution will be opened.”

There are opinions that relate the comeback of the PKK, which was told to be over, from 2004 on with traumatic acts and attacks with the conjuncture that was brought by Iraq War, support of the USA which was angry with Turkey and USA’s serious arms and logistics support. Do you think that these are also effective?

No, I think this was a perfect engineering work from the beginning till the end. The PKK’s establishment, its reorganisation after Öcalan was caught, the fixation of the broken nets were a great engineering work by the government. This way – the government would – keep Kurdish movement under control and use the PKK. Same play is on the stage again.  They didn’t want to let any opposition to arise. Hence, they didn’t. For example once Hikmet Fidan wanted to found a different party, they shot him in Diyarbakır. Some opposed to the restart of the war in Kandil in 2004, they got eliminated. Nizamettin Taş and Osman Öcalan (Abdullah Öcalan’s brother) were against the war, so they left the mountain. But then everything went on as how the government wanted it to be, the PKK was again put in war position since 2004, to create a tension with conflicts, to turn it into a fireground and eventually lead to a coup. But juntas, the ones that stepped in, in 2002 couldn’t be successful. They are being judged in ‘Balyoz’ and ‘Ergenekon’ cases, these are important facts.

Do you say that in the increase of armed acts there is the effect of deep state, Ergenekon as expressed nowadays?

Yes. Ergenekon directed the incidents with its connections in the PKK. Back then Öcalan was in İmralı, under the control of the army, he sent his lawyer and asked the war to be started, it’s as simple as this. Öcalan was under the supervision of the Ergenekon and Balyoz. Thereby they brought the PKK into action, to stir up trouble. This is what Kenan Evren did before September the 12th… This has been made in a more obvious manner. But this time they couldn’t succeed, fortunately they couldn’t succeed. Now the situation is different for both the PKK and Öcalan. Military tutelage is regressed. Some of the generals who led a coup are being judged now, the army control over İmralı has reduced. The government strengthened its hand. Now the government is trying to disarm the PKK through Öcalan. If the PKK disarms, everybody wants this; the door for peace and resolution will be opened.

Well then, is the deep state really being eliminated in the Ergenekon process? Or is this just a struggle between juntas?

Juntas got caught, they are disgraced. It’s not anything, it’s extremely important but this doesn’t mean that the deep state is eliminated. And of course it’s not easy, deep state lost its ability to operate but I don’t think that it’s completely eliminated. I think there are still cells that have not given an account and awaiting, and sides that are waiting for an opportunity and if they find it they may again make provocation.

“Kurdish issue is a multidimensional issue. It concerns people over than 20 million who live in the borders of Turkey and forms the majority in a specific geographic area. This kind of an issue must be resolved as how it was resolved in other parts of the world. With a wider project, with more radical and courageous steps. That is a just resolution on the basis of equality.”

Let’s open up HAK-PAR a little bit more. What should be the demands of Kurdish people according to HAK-PAR? What do Kurdish people exactly want, for example a new constitutional law will be issued, what are Kurdish people’s demands at this point? What do you think as HAK-PAR?

We want a resolution on the basis of equality. And that is federation; we want Kurdish to be second official language in Turkey, as it is in Iraq. In Iraq, Kurdish is an official language besides Arabic. We also want it to be the same. The new constitutional law must seize the mother tongue education. The existing one is prohibiting this. Second one, a new identity must be described. Existing description of identity assumes everybody is Turkish, degrades everybody to one ethnicity; there mustn’t be an identity description such as this. Turkey is a very colorful society, where different people live in. Trying to turn everybody Turkish, calling everybody Turkish is a 90 years old wrong policy. And the problem is this policy’s output. A new identity description is necessary because this way Kurdish people can find a place for themselves, for the new constitutional law, they can say that this is our law, too. Third one is that there must be decentralization. Unitary state can’t meet Turkey’s needs. Turkish society is multi-colored. Decentralization must have a place in the new constitutional law, in practice this can be autonomy or federation. I think if the new constitutional law will be a democratic one and will offer a solution for the Kurdish issue and other issues, then these kinds of principles must take place in it. Apart from that, of course a more democratic constitutional law must be created, in compliance with the European standards, we want this.

You say that other democratic rights also must be developed. How did you face the AKP government’s coming into power? Steps were taken. Then “Kurdish Initiative” has been started, though after it was started its name was changed. How do you see the beginning of the process and after? Then do you think there was a mistake, a mistake in the method?

We approved the initiative, we supported it, but it didn’t last. Constructive things happened. For example, firstly Kurdish issue became arguable. It’s still being argued in newspapers and televisions. Besides, a Kurdish channel named TRT-Şeş started to broadcast, it’s of course constructive. Even in schools, 2 hours of mother tongue lessons were added. Kurdish language departments opened in some universities. We approved and always supported these. But it reached to some extent and then stopped, it didn’t continue. Kurdish issue is a multidimensional issue. It concerns more than 20 million people who live within the borders of Turkey and forms the majority in a specific geographic area. This kind of an issue must be resolved as how it was resolved in other parts of the world. With a wider project, with more radical and courageous steps. That is a just resolution on the basis of equality.

“The state of the ones who will lay down the arms must be clearly settled, way to politics must be opened.”

How do you find the latest negotiations? How do you see the process that has started with Oslo negotiations and continues in İmralı? Do you care about it?

Of course I care about it. For disarmament, to convince, it is natural to negotiate. The government is trying to get a result through Öcalan when Oslo negotiations came to nothing. But a negotiation can be made with the BDP, a dialog can be made with the PKK. The prime minister already said that these can happen, I find it natural. If the PKK lays down the arms after these negotiations, I would be pleased, for me, first disarmament must be provided reciprocally, and without this it is hard to create an environment for dialogue.

Can the PKK lay down the arms? We must be realistic, Karayılan (Mustafa Karayılan) says –when we lay down the arms we can lose everything, is this how it’s done, is this the method?

Arms can be laid down, with reassuring steps. The state of the ones who will lay down the arms must be clearly settled, way to politics must be opened. Political remission can be brought up later on.

Do you think the AKP gives this reassurance?

At this stage, there is no well-coordinated project yet.

In this last month first the prime minister made statements like we will bring the execution and then we will cancel the parliamentary immunity of the congressmen from BDP and then İmralı negotiations started to take place. Society is also confused about where it leads, what is happening.

This process has its ups and downs, to look at this and become completely optimistic or pessimistic is not right. If the government wants to get a result, it has to be decisive, it must be more courageous and it mustn’t retreat against obstacles. Because when we take a look at the previous practices, we see that it is not decisive at all.

“Until now the CHP couldn’t carry out a constructive opposition. They assumed that resisting every step taken is opposition, they even opposed to TRT-Şeş, they are even opposing to the right of defence in mother tongue. This way the CHP can’t contribute to the resolution of the problem, it will become inhibitive.”

Do you think other parties’ support is a must or the AKP should walk alone at this point? 

Of course this is not only the AKP’s concern, especially main opposition party CHP’s attitude is extremely important. Until now the CHP couldn’t carry out a constructive opposition. They assumed that resisting every step taken is the opposition, they even opposed to TRT-Şeş, they are even opposing to the right of defence in mother tongue. This way the CHP can’t contribute to the resolution of the problem, it will become inhibitive. I don’t see the MHP as a negative case; they don’t even accept the existence of the Kurdish issue. If you don’t accept the existence of a problem, of course you can’t offer a solution. But the CHP has a more indecisive attitude, as the main opposition party its attitude is very important. Certainly, the CHP must support constructive steps and if it finds the steps insufficient, it must come up with well-coordinated proposals and projects for the resolution of this problem. Besides, the BDP mustn’t carry out policies based on the AKP opposition. It must try to become a side, a partner. It also must support the constructive steps and if it finds it insufficient, it must come up with suggestions that will resolve the problem. As HAK-PAR our policy is this. We are not prejudicial, from the beginning we supported the constructive steps, supported the government against the restraints of the status quo, but at the same time we say that the government needs to come up with a comprehensive project to solve the problem.

If you receive an invitation from the AKP asking for your contribution, would you want to contribute?

As a party, of course, we are a side in the resolution. The addressee in disarmament is the PKK, because they use the arms. But in the resolution of the Kurdish issue they are not alone as addressee, the PKK can’t represent Kurdish people alone and Öcalan is not the only representative of the Kurdish people alone. When it comes to the resolution of the Kurdish issue, we are also a party. Above all, there is a community, this people have demands and the government must fulfill these demands, it must do whatever it takes for a fair resolution in the basis of equality.

You gave many examples from the past, how do you interpret the three murders in France (murder of three women from the PKK).

I think this is an act for sabotaging the process. The inside of the affair has not been revealed yet, so we can’t say anything sure; but as it seems, it happened right after the process started, so it looks like an act for blocking the process.

“Middle East is changing; Turkey has to change its 90 years of refusal and assimilation. These ideas are now being argued vastly in the media. This will inevitably affect politics too.”

The change in the AKP’s foreign policy, the assertions that Turkey opened up to the establishment of Kurdistan state and changed its redlines, and the AKP’s nearly collaborating with Kurdish people in Iraq and Syria etc. … How do you evaluate these?

During the past 15-20 years there have been very important changes. For example, In Iraq, there is the formation of Kurdistan Federation, with its parliament, government and official language. Turkey has to accept this fact unavoidably. Now there is a change in Syria too, most probably after the Esad regime collapses Syria will be restructured. This can be a reconstruction as in Iraq, for example Kurdish people can construct an autonomous government in their area. This wind of change will continue, it will affect Iran, Iran has a vast Kurdish district that is described as East Kurdistan. From the Armenian border to Elan district, 8-10 million Kurdish population live there. Same thing can happen there as well. Middle East is changing; Turkey has to change its 90 years old politics of refusal and assimilation. These ideas are now being argued vastly in the media. This will inevitably affect politics too.

How do you see the KCK, the KCK structuring that is alleged to exist in the cities?

I see it as an unnecessary and false association, it is an association that appeared after Öcalan was caught and placed in İmralı. I think government has a hand in this, you already know that the existence of around 1000 MIT agents in the KCK was mentioned, this is very surprising, unbelievable. It doesn’t matter even if it were 50; it’s obvious that this has been developed as a government project to control the Kurdish movement. It is inconceivable, scandalous to prepare such an organization with the government and also arresting thousands of them. Look, there is the BDP as a legal association, it’s in the parliament and it is legal, it has municipalities, there is the PKK as an illegal association. What about this association? Moreover it is related to Karayılan who is in the charge of the armed organization. The KCK is a false association; whoever created it, didn’t create it in good faith. In my opinion, the thing to do now is to find a solution for this problem. How to find it is a different issue, I mean releasing thousands of people. But there is no need for an association like the KCK.

“Turkey is undergoing a change, even though that there will be ups and downs and it will be painful I believe that we will overcome this obstacle too. Kurdish people will become free and Turkey will be democratised, we will live together peacefully.”

Lastly, you spent a lifetime for political struggle. Does it bother you not to be able to spare enough time for literature?

Naturally when you spare this much time for politics it happens. Despite that I published nearly 10 poetry books. Some of them are in Kurdish; most of them are in Turkish. Besides that I wrote children’s books, stories, essays. Some of my books were released with several pen names, I wrote with 5-6 different names. For example I wrote as Ferhad Can, Cemali, Cemil Baran. One of my children’s books was written with the name Baran, one with Cemali. Besides my essays were released with the name Ferhad Can. I wrote on history and language. I have nearly 60 books. 43 of them are in the size of a book, others are booklets.

You touched upon very important points today. We talked about struggle, terrorism, war, destructions, destroyed hopes, hopelessness. Turkey had very hard times in the 1970s, 1980s. After the coup and destruction environment that was created in the 1980s, your poem “Hadi Gülümse” (Come on, Smile) recovered everybody’s morale; attracted a great attention as a Sezen Aksu song. When we look at the 1990s and 2000s do you still say “Hadi Gülümse”, can we smile despite of everything?

Despite of everything, of course I’m an optimist; I’ve never lost my hope. I didn’t enter politics that willingly but I do it for 50 years now. I wouldn’t be able to last it this long if I didn’t have my beliefs, hopes. Turkey is undergoing a change, even though that there will be ups and downs and it will be painful I believe that we will overcome this obstacle too. Kurdish people will become free and Turkey will be democratised, we will live together peacefully.

Mr. Burkay, thank you very much. You expressed your thoughts frankly. You’ve made some statements that will provoke different parties. I hope we can internalise democracy and learn to listen to each other more and tolerate the opposing views and stop attacking others using violence as the first solution whenever we get angry.

It was my pleasure. I wish lots of success to you, your friends, and your research centre. I heartily share your wishes and hope for a world that is peaceful for everyone, full of love, and more liveable.

© 2013 ResearchTurkey. All rights reserved. This publication cannot be printed, reproduced, or copied without referencing the original source.

Please cite this publication as follows:

ResearchTurkey (May, 2013), “Interview with Mr. Kemal Burkay (2^nd Part): ‘Democratic Autonomy’ is not a Well-Grounded Demand”, Vol. II, Issue 3, pp.6-18, Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, ResearchTurkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=3118)

The Institute of International Relations (I.I.R.) of Panteion University of Athens organizes in cooperation with South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) its 22^nd Annual Summer Seminar which will be held on the island of Tinos, Greece, from June 29 to July 4, 2013.

This year’s Summer Seminar will seek answers to the following questions:

• How is Greece impacting, and being impacted by, these developments?
• What is Turkey’s role on the regional stage?
• How might the Republic of Cyprus better manage its mineral wealth?
• What part do Israel and Egypt play in regional stability?
• What can we expect from the Arab uprisings?
• How will major external forces (the U.S., the EU) with strong footing in the region proceed in light of recent developments?
• How is the economic crisis in the European south impacting regional affairs?

For more information, as well as an application form: http://www.idis.gr/?p=1297