From Demand for an Islamic State to the Boko Haram Insurgency: Historical Analysis of Nigeria’s Experience with Islamism

From Demand for an Islamic State to the Boko Haram Insurgency:
Historical Analysis of Nigeria’s Experience with Islamism

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between militant Islamism and political Islamism. By observing Nigeria’s experience with Islamism, it attempts to put into context the motives and goals of political Islamism and militant Islamism. The article starts by recalling pre-colonial Islamic movements in the northern part of Nigeria and how Islamism once represented the people’s political expression. While British colonialism laid the political foundation and legal framework for secularism in Nigeria, what began as an Islamist anti-colonial resistance during colonisation became a de-Nigerialisation movement when Islamic leaders pressed for the jurisdiction of sharia law after the country’s independent. The article further examines whether militant Islamism escalates as a result of the sharia’s institution in the country’s constitution. It shows that although the Sharia movement in Nigeria was generally non-violent except under the legal sanctions of the strict aspects of Islamic law, the fulcrum of militant Islamism is terrorism. However, while not mutually exclusive, the occurrence of political Islamism presented a backdrop to the occurrence of the militant Islamism.

***

Several attempts to conceptualise the word Islamism have wrestled with the broadness of the term. As an umbrella term applied to a variety of diverse Islamic movements, Islamism is often used either in a political context –i.e. to establish Islamic legitimacy of political authority based on God’s revelation in the Quran[1] or militant context– i.e. to justify violent acts against non-believers in accordance with God’s revelation in the Quran. A closer look at both forms of Islamism reveals a clear incompatibility with western secularism that envisions a separation of religion and state.  Perhaps the most simplified way to define Islamism is to conceive the term, as a movement within Islam that adheres to the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life.[2]

Nigeria’s experience with Islamism epitomises the inseparability of political Islam and militant Islam. Even though the spread of Islam in Nigeria dates back to the 11th century when it first appeared in Borno, a north-eastern state of the country,[3] the rise of Islamism became apparent in the 19th century Sokoto caliphate.

The Sokoto caliphate grew out of the Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio, an Islamic scholar motivated by reformist ideas. The Caliphate –which marked a new era of Islam in Nigeria– arose in 1804 and grew into one of the most significant empires in Africa with more than 30 different emirates and over 10 million people.[4] More importantly, the empire saw the creation of the first formidable Islamic State in Nigeria’s Northern region and arguably marked the beginning of the spread of Islam by Jihad (holy war) in the Region.[5]

en1

Source: Blackpast.org http://www.blackpast.org/gah/sultanate-sokoto-sokoto-caliphate

Figure 1: Map of the pre-colonial Sokoto Caliphate

Dan Fodio’s jihad was a protagonist of a defensive form of jihad based on the strict observance of a Quranic injunction.[6] Due to its popularity and the wide consensus it received among the Sokoto indigenes, it is argued that it represented the people’s political expression and a desire to establish a proper Islamic society across the northern Nigerian region.[7]  Hence, as with many forms of political Islamism, the Sokoto experience had revolutionary connotations and largely benefitted from the declining legitimacy of the previous empire in the region.

In 1903, the caliphate was overthrown when –at the grand market square of Sokoto– the last Vizier of the caliphate officially conceded to British Rule.[8] It is however worth noting that even though the British took over the territory and began the process of colonising the Northern part of Nigeria, the advent of colonial rule did not change the authority structure of the caliphate.[9] While the British conquerors replaced the caliphate’s Sultan and Emirs who refused to submit to their rule, the latter retained the existing system of authority and administration, which eventually became the model for the system of colonisation. Under the colonisation system, known as indirect rule, the Emirs were renamed “Native Authorities” and utilised by the British as the basic unit of local and regional administration.[10]

Between 1903 and 1960, colonisation of Northern Nigerian took place. During this period, the influence of the Sokoto caliphate in Islamic opposition to British colonisation became twofold. First, an Islamic opposition to the Western influence on governance began to develop. The colonisation method used, i.e. indirect rule, caused a division among the people of Northern Nigeria, who were once united by Islam. This division saw, on one side, the so-called “civilised” –by Western standards– elite who were used by the British as agents of colonisation; and on the other side, the commoners, who vehemently resisted Western influence in the region.[11] Accounts hold that the indigenous colonial agents –often traders, scribes and clerks– led lives that were physically, attitudinally and materially removed from their hosts.[12]  Specifically, an account of the ruling system adopted by the British colonial authorities in the region held that, “like the white colonialist, these black imperialists would not live amongst and mix with the people. They stayed on their own. They had their own quarters just as the Whiteman had his own Government Reservation Area.”[13]  The Sokoto caliphate’s served as an inspiration for an Islamic anti-colonial resistance during this period.

Secondly, during the 1950s –just before Nigeria’s independence– a trend to suggest that political parties in Northern Nigeria drew inspiration from the Sokoto Caliphate was beginning to take form. This development was apparent in the showdown of supremacy between two of the region’s foremost political parties, the Conservative Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU),[14] who both tried to prove which adhered most to the Sokoto Caliphate. While the NPC, a party formed by Islamic elites, was keen to maintain the existing political arrangement with the British Colonialists, which allowed its members to monopolise power in the region, the NEPU was characterised by Islamic radicalism and often accused British Colonisation of being a system of oppression.[15]

Sokoto Caliphate’s influence on partisan politics was particularly significant during this period mainly because of the crucial role to be played by political parties in governing the new Nigerian State after independence. Even though both the NEPU and the NPC similarly referenced the Sokoto caliphate in their policies, religious justifications for Jihad expressed by Dan Fodio -the founder of the caliphate- tended to be much more detailed in the NEPU’s political discussions than what was found in the literature of the NPC.[16] Also, while the NPC focused on maintaining the colonisation status quo in the years leading to Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the NEPU party became a symbol of dissatisfaction with colonial rule and a radical alternative to the NPC.[17] Lastly, the NEPU planned to use politics and religion to create a “Northern Nigerian Society of Social Justice, Economic Prosperity and Fairness” which would transfer power from the pro-western leaders to the talakawa i.e. the commoner.[18] For these reasons, it became evident that the communal-level dissatisfaction with colonisation had found its way into politics, captured effectively by the NEPU. It is often argued that this planted the seed for overtly extreme anti-western Islamism that would lead to the emergence of militant groups like Boko Haram. Further, an ideological division between those in favour of a westernised way of government and those in favour of an Islamic state became entrenched in northern Nigeria’s politics.

In 1960, Nigeria became independent. The country’s first constitution (i.e. Supreme Law) was a secular caricature of the Westminster (British) model.[19] Under this constitution Nigeria retained Queen Elizabeth II as titular head of state.[20] But unsurprisingly, there was a call in the first decade of independence by the Pro-Islamists in the Northern region for an autochthonous constitution that reflects the will of indigenes, rather than that of the colonial masters. From this decade onward, a concept known as Islamist de-Nigerialisation gradually crept into Nigeria, through the back door.

In 1978, a conference was held to discuss the possibility of establishing a new constitution.[21] Alhaji Shehu Shagari, representing the northern Nigeria constituent suggested that civil sharia law ought to be incorporated into the country’s constitution. In his pro-sharia lines of argument, Shagari insisted that Sharia should be accorded a federal status in Nigeria where a federal sharia court of appeal will be established.[22] The rationale of this argument was that since the Nigerian constitution –during the period– was derived from Judeo-Christian origins, the laws could not adequately cater for the legal needs of Muslims in the country.[23] The rest of the delegates resisted at first but later reached a consensus and agreed that civil sharia law represented the northerner’s customary law and should be incorporated into Nigeria’s constitution. As a result, a new constitution was enacted in 1979. The 1979 constitution, which abandoned the Westminster system in favour of an American-style presidential system, gave all states some degree of sovereignty.[24] More importantly, Sharia Law became recognised for the first time since the creation of Nigeria.

Coincidence or not, Islamic terrorism became a national phenomenon the following decade when several violent sects –prominent among which is the radical Maitatsine movement led by controversial Islamic Preacher Mohammed Marwa– began to use Islam as a tool for instigating unprecedented violence. Marwa claimed to be a prophet and saw himself in the image of Usman Dan Fodio, the creator of the Sokoto Caliphate. He denounced Western influence and Moderate Muslims, who did not directly oppose Western influence in a way that is parallel with Boko Haram’s anti-western rhetoric. As a result, Marwa instigated riots and armed clashes, which pitted his followers against police and the army and led to deaths of thousands in Nigeria. While Marwa was killed in 1980, killings instigated by Maitatsine movement continued into the 1980s. Thousands more were killed and some analysts even view Boko Haram as an extension of the Maitatsine riots.[25]

The 1990s presented Nigeria with a different Islamist proposition. The search for international endorsement led some Islamists from the Northern part of Nigeria to travel to Sudan in the mid-1990s,[26] where Osama Bin Laden was incidentally on exile. It is worth noting that, according to a report by an International watchdog, Bin Laden was to later help provide Boko Haram’s seed money when in 2002, he dispatched an aide to Nigeria to hand out $3 million in local currency to a wide array of Salafist political organisations there that shared al Qaeda’s goal of imposing Islamic rule.[27] Also, other studies have tried to establish the extent to which Bin Laden was involved in Boko Haram’s emergence. Prominent among them is an article that hypothesised that Boko Haram was influenced by Al-Qaeda through Ibn Taymiyya’s ideology of political authority in Islam.[28] In this article, the author referred to Bin Laden’s citation of Ibn Taymiyya in his sermon of 2003 when he said ‘The most important religious duty –after belief itself– is to ward off and fight the enemy aggressor. Šayḫ al-Islam (Ibn Taymiyya), may Allāh have mercy upon him, said: “to drive off the enemy aggressor who destroys both religion and the world –there is no religious duty more important than this, apart from belief itself. This is an unconditional rule.”[29] Similarly, in what looks like a furtherance of Ibn Taymiyya’s ideology, the founder of Boko Haram- Mohammed Yusuf preached, “Our land was an Islamic state before it (sic) was turned into a land of kafir (infidel), the current system is contrary to true Muslim beliefs”.[30]

In December 1994, the first manifestation of what seemed to have become an internationalised Islamic terrorism in Nigeria was realised. The Nigerian Islamist expatriates in Sudan who were allegedly in contact with Bin Laden were implicated in the murder of Gideon Akaluka, a young trader who allegedly desecrated the Koran.[31] Akaluka was arrested by the police in Kano, a northern Nigerian state, after his wife allegedly used pages of the Koran as toilet paper for her baby. After he was imprisoned, a group of Islamists broke into the jail, killed him, and walked around the city parading his severed head.[32] Captured on video and shown on National TV, the beheading was a massive shock to most Nigerians. Responding to the incident, General Sani Abacha, the country’s Military Head of State, rose to the occasion and decisively killed the perpetrators.[33]

In 1999, Nigeria adopted a new constitution that restored democracy in the country. A year after, a northern state governor –Ahmed Sani Yerima– began pushing for a constitutional institution of sharia as the main body of civil and criminal law in 12 northern states.[34] The result was that Sharia, which previously did not apply to criminal offences in a secular Nigeria, would be instituted as a main body of civil and criminal law in the country’s Northern region. Nigeria’s then President, Olusegun Obasanjo, showed what many perceived to be weakness by refusing to interfere in Governor Yerima’s unconstitutional act. Even though the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provided for the establishment and jurisdiction of the Sharia Court of Appeal in section 275,[35] it categorically made provisions in sections 10 and 38 for the secularity of Nigeria and the protection of the fundamental human right of freedom of thought, conscience and religion.[36] Speaking on the first execution under Sharia Law in Nigeria, the Executive Director of the African Division of Human Rights Watch, Peter Takirambudde said, “the death penalty is an inhuman, degrading and cruel punishment which cannot be justified in any circumstance, however brutal the crime of which the defendant is accused.”[37]

The institution of the sharia penal code began to make a difference when on March 2002, Amina Lawal, an unmarried pregnant woman, was sentenced to death for adultery by a newly formed Sharia court. Even though the sentence was never carried out mainly because of national and global outcry,[38] this incident exposed religious tensions between the Christian and Muslim regions of Nigeria.

Also in 2002, an Islamist state government in northern Nigeria issued a fatwa urging Muslims to kill a British-educated Journalist, Isioma Daniel, who made a statement about what she believed to be Prophet Mohammed’s susceptibility to women during Miss World 2002 beauty pageant.[39] The fatwa was announced by Zamfara State deputy governor Mamuda Aliyu Shinkafi, drawing comparison with the infamous decree by Iranian religious leaders, when he said “Like Salman Rushdie, the blood of Isioma Daniel can be shed, it is binding on all Muslims, wherever they are, to consider the killing of the writer as a religious duty.”[40] The fatwa and subsequent riots claimed more than 200 lives, while 11,000 people were made homeless.[41] Again, Nigeria’s President at the time, Olusegun Obasanjo, was sympathetic towards radical Islam when he pinned the blame for the killings on “irresponsible journalism.”[42] More importantly, the incident further exposed religious tensions in post-sharia Nigeria.                                         

On May 2011, a Christian southerner named Goodluck Jonathan was sworn in as the President of Nigeria after defeating a Muslim northerner. What followed was the most extreme form of Islamism in the country. Boko Haram established itself shortly after when it claimed responsibility for a bomb attack on the United Nations headquarters in Nigeria that killed 23 people on 26 August 2011.[43] The radical militant sect, formed in 2001, is associated with an antediluvian and narrow version of Islam (Wahhabism), which started off as a revivalist movement in the 18th century and is generally viewed as the source of modern day global terrorism.[44]

On April 2014, the world was captivated when more than 200 school girls were kidnapped from Chibok by the group. Today, it is estimated Boko Haram now occupies 20 per cent of Nigerian territory mostly in the three northwest states, a land mass the size of Maryland, United States of America and a population of more than two million.[45] Although it is difficult to record a death toll, the Nigerian Security Tracker has attributed over 17,000 deaths to Boko Haram’s insurgency since 2011.[46]

Boko Haram’s ultimate goal is to undermine the federal government and establish an Islamic State in Nigeria. This could lead one to assume that the sect’s goal is a reflection of the rising urge to Islamise Nigeria. However, this may not be the case. Yusuf, the acclaimed founder of Boko Haram, was reportedly a member of northern Nigerian Borno State Sharia implementation committee under Governor Mala Kachallah, and was an active participant in Islamic debates on television and radio.[47] After Kachallah left the gubernatorial seat in May 2003, Yusuf’s Islamisation agenda saw a shift from political to militant. Suggestions indicate that when he lost out with the new state government –led by Governor Ali Modu Sheriff– Yusuf shunned collaboration with the Nigerian government, preaching instead for a return to the original sources in Islam.[48]

Some analysts suggest that Boko Haram initially emerged in 1995 as a non-violent socio-religious movement known under the name “The People Committed to hijra and the Prophet’s Teachings (ahl al-sunna wa jama’a al-hijra),” before declaring the entire Islamic dominated city of Maiduguri the sect’s birthplace intolerably corrupt and irredeemable in 2002.[49] Other accounts assert that the reason Mohammed Yusuf founded the sect was because he saw an opportunity to exploit public outrage at government corruption by linking it to Western influence in governance. Boko Haram’s preference for an extremely narrow interpretation of Islam and an overt use of indiscriminate violence may be seen as an ideological demarcation from political Islamism but its consistent anti-western rhetoric is very much in line with the revolutionary Islamism that preceded its existence.

Source: Basemap data  http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/b-acaps-briefing-note-nigeria-boko-haram-insurgency_map.pdf

Source: Basemap data
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/b-acaps-briefing-note-nigeria-boko-haram-insurgency_map.pdf

Figure 2: Heat map showing numbers of recorded events of Boko Haram’s violence against civilians in 2014 and 2015

The pre-colonial Sokoto caliphate became a symbolic inspiration to Nigeria’s militant Islamism- as seen in Marwa’s Maitatsine riots, and to political Islamism- as seen with the fascination of Islamic state creation which started as an anti-colonial movement and extended into the Islamist De-Nigerialisation movement. Is it a coincident that on two different occasions, Islamic terrorism has escalated in Nigeria immediately after the institution of Sharia in the country’s law? We see from Nigeria’s history, especially after 1979 and 1999 constitutions, that there is a relationship between the enactment of Sharia law and rise of Islamism. We see also that even though political Islam in Nigeria once represented an important vehicle for resisting inequalities and overthrowing existing entrenched elites, its revolutionary ideals began to degenerate from the 1980s and finally abandoned by Boko Haram, who have opted for a militant approach in fighting the entrenched elite. The violent tendencies of the Boko Haram sect represent a different kind of Islamism than that witnessed in Nigeria’s political stratosphere. While the Sharia movement was generally non-violent except under the legal sanctions of the strict aspects of Islamic law, the fulcrum of Boko Haram’s Islamism is terrorism.

Femi Owolade, MA in Medical Ethics and Law, King’s College London

Please cite this publication as follows:

Owolade, F. (August, 2015), “From Demand for an Islamic State to the Boko Haram Insurgency: Historical Analysis of Nigeria’s Experience with Islamism”, Vol. IV, Issue 8, pp.35-46, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, Research Turkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=9648)

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Endnotes

[1]Atta Barkindo, “Join the Caravan: The Ideology of Political Authority in Islam from Ibn Taymiyya to Boko Haram in North-Eastern Nigeria,” Terrorism Perspectives 7(3):30-42. (2013). p.32.

[2]Sheri Berman, “Islamism, Revolution and Civil Society,” Perspectives on Politics 1 (2) (Indiana, 2003).

[3]“Islam in Nigeria,” African Studies Centre Leiden, 02/08/2012. [Accessed on 19th June 2015], Available at: http://www.ascleiden.nl/content/webdossiers/islam-nigeria#Introduction

[4]Toyin Falola and Ann Genova, “Historical Dictionaries of Africa,” Scarecrow Press (Maryland, 2009). Even though the caliphate had no direct connection to subsequent Islamism in Nigeria, Murray Last asserts that it may have served as an inspiration.  According to Last, the jihad accomplished what was intended by its leaders: to establish a political structure in which Islam could flourish.

[5]Yusufu Turaki, “Tainted Legacy: Islam, Colonialism and Slavery in Northern Nigeria,” Isaac Publishing (Virginia, 2010). In this study, Yusufu Turaki traces the origins of the current crisis to the historical impact of Islam on Northern Nigerian society. He discusses the nature and significance of Islamic colonialism and slavery in West Africa, and how their malign influence was entrenched by the British colonial administration of the twentieth century.

[6]See Atta Barkindo, “Join the Caravan: The Ideology of Political Authority in Islam from Ibn Taymiyya to Boko Haram in North-Eastern Nigeria,” Terrorism Perspectives 7(3):30-42. (2013).

[7]Eyene Okpanachi, “Nigeria: Ethno-religious identity and conflict in northern Nigeria,” Centri, 10/01/2012. [Accessed on 18th June 2015], Available at:

http://www.cetri.be/spip.php?article2470

See also Atta Barkindo, “Join the Caravan: The Ideology of Political Authority in Islam from Ibn Taymiyya to Boko Haram in North-Eastern Nigeria,” Terrorism Perspectives 7(3):30-42. (2013). pp.34-35.

[8]Toyin Falola, Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria,” Indiana University Press (Indiana, 2009)

[9]Jonathan Reynolds, “The Politics of History: The Legacy of the Sokoto Caliphate in Nigeria,” International studies in sociology and social anthropology Vol.67 (Leiden, 1997).

[10]Ibid.

[11]Femi Owolade, “Boko Haram: How a Militant Islamist Group Emerged in Nigeria,” The Gatestone Institute, 27/03/2014. [Accessed on 19th June 2015], Available at:

http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4232/boko-haram-nigeria

[12]Moses Ochonu, “Colonialism within Colonialism: The Hausa-Caliphate Imaginary and the British Colonial Administration of the Nigerian Middle Belt,” African Studies Quarterly (Gainesville, 2008)

[13] Ibid. citing A.P. Anyebe, “Man of Courage and Character: The Ogbuluko War in Colonial Idomaland,” Fourth Dimension Publishers (Enugu, 2002).

[14] Jonathan Reynolds, “The Politics of History: The Legacy of the Sokoto Caliphate in Nigeria,” International studies in sociology and social anthropology Vol. 67 (Leiden, 1997).

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Oneyebuchi Uwakah, “Due process in Nigeria’s administrative law system: History, Current Status and Future,” University Press of America (Maryland, 1997).

[20]Ibid.

[21]Uchenna Emelonye and Robert Buergenthal, “Nigeria: Peacebuilding through Integration and Citizenship,” International Development Law Organization (Rome, 2011)

[22]Femi Ajayi, “The Effect of Religion on the Political Process: The Case of the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal 1975-1990,” iUniverse (Bloomington, 2009).

[23]Ibid.

[24]Oneyebuchi Uwakah, “Due process in Nigeria’s administrative law system: History, Current Status and Future,” University Press of America (Maryland, 1997).

[25]Mohammed Aly Sergie and Toni Johnson, “Boko Haram,” Council on Foreign Relations, 05/03/2015. [Accessed on 16th June 2015], Available at:

http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739

[26]Pointblank News, ‘1995 Beheading of Akaluka: Group to Drag Sanusi to National Conference’ Pointblank News (March 28, 2014) Available at:

http://pointblanknews.com/pbn/exclusive/1995-beheading-of-akaluka-group-to-drag-sanusi-to-national-conference

[27]Eli Lake, “Boko Haram’s Bin Laden Connection,” The Daily Beast, 05/11/2014. [Accessed on 15th June 2015], Available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/05/11/boko-haram-s-bin-laden-connection.html

[28]Atta Barkindo, “Join the Caravan: The Ideology of Political Authority in Islam from Ibn Taymiyya to Boko Haram in North-Eastern Nigeria,” Terrorism Perspectives 7(3):30-42. (2013)

[29]Ibid. p.35.

[30]Ibid.

[31]See “1995 Beheading of Akaluka: Group to Drag Sanusi to National Conference,” Pointblank, 28/03/2014. [Accessed on 14th June 2015], Available at:

http://pointblanknews.com/pbn/exclusive/1995-beheading-of-akaluka-group-to-drag-sanusi-to-national-conference/

[32] Karl Maier, “Beheading stirs Nigerian tension,” The Independent, 16/08/1995. [Accessed on 15 March 2015], Available at:

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/beheading-stirs-nigerian-tension-1596448.html

[33]“1995 Beheading of Akaluka: Group to Drag Sanusi to National Conference,” Pointblank, 28/03/2014. [Accessed on 14th  June 2015], Available at:

http://pointblanknews.com/pbn/exclusive/1995-beheading-of-akaluka-group-to-drag-sanusi-to-national-conference/

[34]“Nigeria Sharia architect defends law,” BBC, 21/03/2002. [Accessed on 15th March 2015], Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1885052.stm

[35]Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. p. 275

[36]Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. pp. 10 and 38

[37]“Nigeria: First Execution under Sharia Condemned,” Human Rights Watch, 09/01/2002 [Accessed on 16th  March 2015], Available at:

http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2002/01/08/nigeria-first-execution-under-sharia-condemned

[38]Ali Mazrui, “Nigeria: From the Sharia Movement to Boko Haram,” Al Arabiya News, June 19, 2012.

[39]Isioma Daniel, ‘‘I lit the match,’’ The Guardian, 17/02/2003. [Accessed on 16th June 2015], Available at:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/17/gender.pressandpublishing

[40]James Astill and Owen Bowcott, “Fatwa is issued on Nigerian journalist,” The Guardian, 27/11/2002. [Accessed on 19th March 2015], Available at:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/27/jamesastill.owenbowcott

[41]Isioma Daniel, ‘‘I lit the match,’’ The Guardian, 17/02/2003. [Accessed on 16th June 2015], Available at:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/17/gender.pressandpublishing

[42]James Astill and Owen Bowcott, “Fatwa is issued on Nigerian journalist,” The Guardian, 27/11/2002. [Accessed on 19th  March 2015], Available at:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/27/jamesastill.owenbowcott

[43]Ibrahim Mshelizza, “Islamist sect Boko Haram claims Nigerian U.N. bombing,” Reuters, 29/08/2011. [Accessed on 15th  March 2015], Available at:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/29/us-nigeria-bombing-claim-idUSTRE77S3ZO20110829

[44]Murtaza Haider, “European Parliament identifies Wahabi and Salafi roots of global terrorism,” Dawn, 22/07/2003. [Accessed on 15th  June 2015] Available at:

http://www.dawn.com/news/1029713

[45]Don North, “Behind the War with Boko Haram,” Consortium News, 16/11/2014. [Accessed on 17th June 2015], Available at:

http://consortiumnews.com/2014/11/16/behind-the-war-with-boko-haram/

[46]John Campbell, “Nigeria Security Tracker: Mapping Violence in Nigeria,” Council on Foreign Relations, 01/06/2015. [Accessed on 19th  June 2015], Available at:

http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483

[47]International Crisis Group, “Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict,” Africa Report, No.168, 20/12/2010.  pp. 37- 40

[48]Atta Barkindo, “Join the Caravan: The Ideology of Political Authority in Islam from Ibn Taymiyya to Boko Haram in North-Eastern Nigeria,” Terrorism Perspectives 7(3):30-42. (2013). p.36.

[49]Ibid.

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